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PREFACE

A voluminous bibliography of excellent materials de
voted to the Sioux War of 1876 attests to the fascination
this subject holds for amateur and professional historians.
One basis of interest may be a morbid preoccupation in the
shocking violence that was manifested as standard practice
by the red man--and sometimes by .'his white adversary*

A

more humane motivation may be found in the sympathy which
many students express on behalf of the underdog,

the Indian.

Other researchers associate themselves, in their imagi
nation, with the hardy folk who forged a civilization in the
savage West,
The object of this work, is to present the role
Brigadier General George Crook fulfilled during the most
■extensive Indian war west of the Mississippi River,

In.

conformance with the precepts of modern historiography,

this

objective will be approached in the following phases: a
study of background events and causitiye factors; review
and analysis of General Croo k 1 s carnualgna durine the conv

-

W

■

fllct; and, his contribution, to immediate results of the
conflict.,
Reference must be made to the works compiled.by con
temporary participants of the Sioux War of 1876.

These

iii

materials have been invaluable in determining chronology
and color.

War Path and Bivouac, by John F. Finerty,

the

doughty correspondent of the Chicago Times, has been
helpful in specifying the dates of marches and camp
locations#

Accounts written by the soldier-authors,

Captain Anson Mills, Lieutenants John G* Bourke, Charles
Xing, and James H. Bradley have been utilized to gain an
understanding of military action#
This literature generally affects the romantic
style typical of the latter half of the nineteenth century,
and often betrays the authors’ partiality to their re 
spective commanders,

Their accounts tend to be highly

localized and a sound perspective of the complete action in
a large campaign is usually lacking#

This deficiency stems

from the limited field of vision of the contemporary
soldier-author, who did not enjoy the blessings of u n r e 
stricted access to all correspondence, particularly that of
high-ranking officials#

Regardless of these limitations,

their works are a valuable contribution to latter day un der
standing of their involvement in historical events.
their records of privation,
compared,

When

sacrifice, and bravery are

they are eornmendably similar in presenting the

details of events,

that were common to their observation.

Indebtedness is acknowledged to the staff personnel
of the Nebraska State Historical Library, the Omaha Public

Library, and the University of Omaha Library for their
kind assistance, or suggestions, during the research phase
of the paper.

Especially appreciated has been the guidance

and scholastic inspiration afforded the writer by Dr.
Roy M. Robbins, Professor of American History, University
of Omaha•
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND

Westward expansion of the United States was forced
by several principal groups.
was the immigrants; miners,

The most important of these
trappers,

traders, ranchers,

and farmers, most of whom traveled toward the new lands
west of the Mississippi in trains of white-topped Conestoga
wagons•
Protection for the immigrants was provided by a n 
other important group--the United States Army.

Garrisoned

in bleak and wretched forts that became the nuclei for
primitive and bustling towns,

cavalrymen aged rapidly or

died young in pursuit of the elusive Plains Indians,
Transportation and supply for the Mest first d e 
manded the important services of the freight wagon and
stage coach organizations.

These groups were later sup

planted by the builders and. operators of railroads.

It was

the Union Pacific and the Northern Pacific that helped spell
the finish of the vigorous Sioux Indians,

These, railroads,

built by the sinew of Chinese and Irish immigrant laborers,
provided a medium for accelerated movement of foodstuffs,
manufactured goods, people, and troops between the outposts
of ■civilization and the economlcallv substantial. Eastern

States®
The odoriferous and avaricious buffalo hunters
played a vital role in curbing the Western Indians.
killers of the plains left bleached bones, where,
several seasons before,

These

only

the shaggy beasts had grazed.

destroying the Indians 1 commissary,

In

they eliminated the

economic underpinnings, of the dreaded plains tribes*
The impact of these groups ripon the primeval West
was repetitious of the course of history as' it had happened
east of the Mississippi.

Initially,

the few white men

venturing into the trans-Mississippi prairies and Rocky
Mountains aroused little more than curiosity in the Indians.
Of course, most of these first adventurers were traders and
trappers, who did not decimate the buffalo herds, assets
considered most tangible by the .Indians.
With the arrival of increased numbers of immigrants
v/hen gold was discovered in Montana, Colorado,

and finally

in the Black Hills of South Dakota, the Indians divined the
ultimate effect on their hunting economy.
responsible Indian leaders, namely,

By 1875,

the more-

Red Cloud and Spotted

Tail of the Sioux, realized that their nomadic way of life
was ended.
During their long fight against the civilized in
vasion,

the Sioux occasionally won Individual battles.

victories were attained through shrewdness,

startling

These

courage, and sacrifice of 'life during charges into the -gun-,
fire of the Great F a t h e r 1s soldiers..

It is unlikely that

any course other than vigorous resistance by the Sioux
could have occurred.

The Indians had every reason to re

ject a system that was diametrically opposed to their concept
of the good life.

Over the years, though, the tribesmen

were battling a never-ending tide of enemy manpower.
It was the United States Army that delivered the coup
de grace.

Western military forces, assigned the task of

placing the defiant, painted bands onto the reservations,
were thinly spread throughout numerous small forts.
fulfilling their assignment,

In

it did not matter tn a t (L3.n

expedition was bloodied at the Rosebud.or another destroyed
at the Little Big Horn.

The persistent government forces,

supplied from areas beyond the Indian:s reach,

continually

harried and finally forced the white m a n ?s will on the
Sioux.

Even Crazy Horse, one of the most valiant protectors

of the old way could see in 1877 that he must walk the white
m a n ’s road.

Farmers and ranchers were to take possession of

the lands, where once the great, black herds had pastured.
Over the tumultous years of Sioux conflict, b e 
ginning with Lieutenant John L. Gratten’s foolish death In
1854, and continuing until the Battle of Wounded Knee cf
1890, the names of white and Indian leaders were common
knowledge.

In 1876,

Sitting Bull,

Red Cloud,

Spotted Tail,

Crazy Horse, Ifump, and Gall-.were leaders of the Sioux
Indians*

Power- among the whites was actively invested in

Army officers who possessed distinguished records*
these notable soldiers were Sherman,

Sheridan,

Among

Terry, Custe

Gibbon, and Crook*
Of the three distinct groups comprising the Sioux
N a t i o n — -the Dakotas, Nakctas, and Lakotas~~.it was the
Lakotas who were the dreaded enemy of 1876*

Since all

members of the major divisions were properly called Sioux,
specific reference will be made to the A r m y ’s great antago
nist,

the Lakotas, known as the Teton Sioux, or e&rlier-

Dwellers of the Prairie*
the Teton Sioux were:
Own; the Brules,

The seven tribes that comprised

the Oglalas, meaning,

Scatter O n e 1s

or Burnt Thighs; the hinneconjoas,

Who Plant by the Stream;

the Cohenonpas, or Two Kettles,

they were more commonly known; the Hunkpapas,
Camp at the Entrance;

or Thos

the SIhasapas,

the San Arcs, or "Without Bows*^

as

or Those Who

or the Blackfeet; and

Allied with the Teton

Sioux In their f ight against the white man, were the Arapahoes and the valiant,

impetuous Northern Cheyennes*

The

Teton Sioux, more hostile to the westward march of civi
lization than any other Plains Indians, mounted a .fierce

5

and desperate resistance to the inroads of the v;asicu.

2

Events of 1876 were crucial to the lives of Indians
and white men alike.

The struggles in Montana, Wyoming,

and South Dakota signaled the end of one civilization and
the dominance of another.

These affairs, most tragic for

the mighty Sioux, were the culmination of repeated failures
to establish mutual faith, respect, and understanding
between the antagonists.
Lack of rapport betv/een the Sioux Indians and the
United States Government stemmed from political,
and cultural differences.

While these factors were r ela

tively simple among the Sioux,
among the Americans.

economic,

they were complex matters

The intense preoccupation of the Y/hite

man with these elements was motivated by a desire for m a 
terialistic achievement.

An aggressive spirit, resulting

from this background, was imparted to the relations the
Western pioneers experienced with the Plains Indians,- who
frustrated the materialistic aim of the Americans.

To

appreciate tne importance of the last great Sioux war,

It

is necessary to recount the major political and economic
developments that initially opened and then widened the
long trail to the troubles of 1876.
o

Wasleu is tne Dakota word for white man.
The
original meaning was Tc a n Jt get rid of them*.n
Robert H. Ruby, The Oglala Sioux, Warriors in
Transition (New York:
Vantage Press, Inc., 1955), p. 14,

6

in a political sense, the problem was initiated in
the G o v e rn me nt ’s establisned policy of locating the Plains
Indians on two separate and enormous reservation areas.
During initial discussions of this plan,

the reservations

were simply referred to as the north and the south Indian
groups,

or-colonies*

3

it was conceived that the Comanches,

Kio was, C h ey e n n e s , and- other lesser tribes of the Kansas,
Oklahoma, Texas areas would be established on the southern
reservation, in the present state of Oklahoma*

Sioux,

Araphoe, Crow, and Pawnee tribes were to be confined to the
northern reservation,

located north of the Platte Paver and

we st of the Mi ssouri•^
'Movement of immigrants to the Far West and Pacific
coastal areas required clearance of the Indians from the
Central Plains areas If continuous turmoil between the
wagon trains and marauding warrior bands was to be m i n i 
mized.

Travel to the new northwest territories was over the

Oregon Trail,
to South Pass.

through Nebraska, along the North Platte River
The southwest territories,

obtained as a

result of the Mexican War, were served by the Santa Fe
Trail that penetrated the plains through Kansas*

Since

^ James C • Mai in, ’'
’Indian Policy and Westward Exp an si o n , 11 Hu man 5.stic S tn d iss, II, N o « 3« Bulletin of the
U ni versity of K a n sas , XX IX , No* 17 (November 1921),
pp. 77-78.
^Memoirs of William T a Sherman (2d e d . ; ITow York;
B*. Appleton & C o * , 1886), p. 435.

7

primary interest in this study concerns conflicts of
interest between the Sioux Indians

(a northern group) and

the Government, discussion of major events will accent
efforts to restrain this formidable people.
In early relations with the' Indians, the United
States Government determined it was cheaper to feed, bribe,
and cajole,

than to fight.

The Treaty of Laramie of 1351,

concluded with the Sioux and the other northern bands, was
a manifestation of this policy.

Major provisions of the

agreement permitted ,!. . . the Government to establish
roads, military and other posts, within their territory,"
granted annuities of trade goods and food to the Sioux for
fifteen years, and designated specific tracts of land as
hunting areas located north of the North Platte for
individual, tribes.

The Indians 1 rights and claims to other
5

lands were not abandoned.
The first agreement at Laramie .was only a.partial
success; fifteen years of comparative peace was observed on
the northern plains.

During this interlude,

the Kansas-

Nebraska Act was introduced by Stephen A. Douglas,
Democratic Senator of Illinois.

the

This proposal, passed, by

Congress in 1854, was of immediate importance because of
the strife it activated between the pro-slavery and
5

Charles J. Kappler, Indian. Affairs.
Laws and
Treatie s , Vol. II: Treaties (Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 3.904*57 PP* 5 9 4 - 9 5 /

anti-slavery forces over the settlement of Kansas.

The dis

placement effects of the Kansas-Nebraska Act on the u n 
suspecting Plains Indians was inherent in the basic aims of
Senator Douglas.
In the ante-bellum era, Douglas was one of the
strongest advocates for construction of the Pacific rail
road.

A northern,

.surveyed.

central,

and southern route had been

Proponents of the southern route,

and New Mexico,

through Texas

stated the railroad would pass through

organized areas, while the northern and central routes
would cross unorganized territories.

Passage of the

Kans&s-Nebraska Act countered the southern argument and
also initiated the settlement of these territories prior to
the Civil War.

Even before the iron rails of the Tinion

Pacific penetrated the prairies, a wedge of white occupancy
was being driven between the northern and southern Plains
Indians.

Completion of the Union Pacific Iiailroad hastened,

the occupation of Nebraska and made the north-south reser
vation policy a reality.

The buffalo herds of Nebraska

were short-lived after completion of the railroad through
the Platte Valley.

By 1875, they were extinct on that
7
portion of the Great Plains.
6
7
(Lincoln:

iv la lin ,

op.

c l t . , pp.

4 8 -4 9 .

E. Donglas Branch, The Hunting of the Bu ffalo
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 203.
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Fifteen years of peace with, the Teton Sioux were
terminated in 1866 by the obtuse conduct of the Government,
In the spring of that year, arrangements were made to renew
the provisions of the 1851 Treaty of Laramie,
with renegotiations,

Concurrent

the United States Army organized a

construction party at Fort Laramie for the purpose of e s 
tablishing strong points along the Bozeman Trail.

On d e 

termining the purpose of these military preparations,

the

most militant Sioux, under the leadership of Red Cloud,
O
angrily withdrew from the parleys.
Under that chieftain1s aggressive leadership,

the

Teton Sioux actively harassed travel and military activity
along the portions of the Bozeman Trail that passed between
Fort Laramie and the eastern slopes of the Big Horn
Mountains.

From 1866 until the summer of 1868, Red C l o u d Ts

followers gave the occupants of Forts Phil Kearney,

Reno,

and C. F. Smith no respite from continuous observation,
feints, and deadly attacks.

The primary engagements of

this period were: the massacre of Captain William J •
Fetterman1s column on December 21, 1866, at Fort Phil
Kearney; the fight with Captain James W, PowellTs w o o d 
cutters, August 2, 1867, near Fort Phil Kearney, which is
now- called the Wagon Box Fight; and the skirmish near 'Fort
Q
Ruby, op. cit ., p. 91.

C. P. .Smith, August 1 , 1867, or the Hayfield Fight#
Occupation of Forts Phil Kearney,

Reno, and C# F#

Smith ?/as terminated in August 1868, by negotiation of the
second agreement between the Teton Sioux and the Govern
ment- -the Treaty of Laramie of 1868#
Closing of the forts resulted in termination of
travel over the Bozeman Trail to Montana#

The latter Treaty

of Laramie has been described as an agreement in which the
Government granted the desires of another party and gained
nothing in compensation#

This contention ignores the w e s t 

ward 'construction progress of the Union Pacific#

By 1868,

the railroad terminal at Cheyenne, within the Rocky Mountain
region, provided direct northward routes to Montana, west of
the Big Horn Mountains,

through safer territory.

In brief,

the wagon road through the western hunting grounds of the
Teton Sioux was not worth a fight.^
In 1871,

the sanctity of the game preserve was

threatened by the projected Northern Pacific Railroad#
Luring the summer of that year, a survey party wended its
way to the south bank of the Yellowstone.
sighted during that survey#

No hostiles were

In 1872, the parties were under

constant survellience by the Sioux and subjected to a de
termined attack by groups of Sioux warriors.
9

Again,

in the

.

Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the
Settlement of the West (Norman:
University of Oklahoma

P??7i“ i 9 ^ ”

TnL94T'
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summer of 1873, a party accompanied by George A, Custer and
the Seventh Cavalry reviewed the proposed Yellowstone route#
C u s t e r ’s force experienced two sharp fights with the Tetons
along the north bank of the Y e l l o w s t o n e . ^
While the security of the Yellowstone) valley hunting
grounds was being threatened, rumors were circulating that
mineral wealth abounded in the Black Hills.

To confirm or

dispel these stories, Lt. Col. George A. Custer led the
Black Hills Expedition of 1874 to that portion of South
Dakota.^

To the Teton Sioux, the Black Hills were a

treasured hunting and camping s i t e - r i c h in game, good
water,

grass for the pony herds, and refuge from the ex

tremes of summer heat and winter v/inds.
venerated the Hills,

The Teton Sioux

calling them their "Meat P a c k " . ^

Although C u s t e r 1s Expedition was not attacked, the Sioux
were indignant over what they considered unjustified tres
passing of property protected by the Laramie Treaty of 1868.
Another Black Hills Expedition of 1874 confirmed the
Indians’ suspicion that the Government would not abide by
^Mar-k H. Brown, The Plainsmen of the Yellowstone
(Hew York:
G* P. P utnam’s Sons, 196TT, pp. 196-209.
IT
xRalph K. Andrist, Tne Long Death: The Last Days
of the Plains Indian (New Y o r k : Macmi 1 1 an Co., 1964),
pp. 244-45.
1? ~ r
iiassrick,

o p . cit . » p. 75.
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the provisions of the treaty.

This time, the column was

led by Lt. Col, Richard Irving Dodge and accompanied by
Professor Walter P, Jenny, of the School of Mines, New York
City,

Both the Custer and Dodge Expedition reported the

presence of gold in the mountain streams#
This information launched an Influx of miners into
the Black Hills,

As if prompted by second thoughts,

the

Government directed closure of the Black Hills to white
settlement.
prospectors.

Cavalry patrols were dispatched to turn back
In spite of these official efforts, determined

gold seekers found their way through, or around the patrols
and the mining population of the Black Hills increased*""
By 1874,

it was becoming evident

Sioux that promises made at Port Laramie

to the Teton
in1868, to

observe the sanctity of Indian treaty property, were to be
broken.

Although the Indians had never completely ceased

their forays against ranchers, fanners, and travelers,

the

proposals for increased war against the white men gained
popularity among the Sioux,
action

has

often

Subsequent intensive military

been justified on the basis ofthe Sioux

S., Congress, House, Report
of the Secretary of
the Interior, 44th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1875, House ex.
Doc, 1 , Part 5, pp*. 683-85*
^^ Do ane Rob in s on, A History of the D akota or Sioux
Indians (1904 ed. repub,; Minneapolis:
Ross 5c Haines,
Inc,, 1956), p, 415,

depredations; but in reality,

the more accurate cause lies

In the G o v e r n m e n t s violation of the 1868 treaty.
As the tenuous situation between the Government
and the Teton Sioux deteriorated,

the quality of United

States Army commanders in the northern Great Plains area
became a subject of prime importance*

The Department of

the Platte was a region faced with an impending confron
tation between the Government and powerful Sioux,
aphorism,

The

!iNothing succeeds like success,” applies to the

assignment of Brigadier General George Crook to the
command of the Platte.
Prior to assuming his new duties in the spring of
1875, General Crook ha d established a reputation as a
successful soldier.

After graduation from the Military

Academy at West Point in 1852, he h a d served on the West
Coast against the Indians of northern California and
Oregon with steadfastness and resolution.

His sober traits

and qualities of leadership accounted for his promotion to
the brevet rank of Major General during the Civil War,
After Appomattox, he reverted,
rapidly promoted contemporaries,
peace-time army.

like many of his

to a lower rank in the

Crook continued on active duty in the

actual rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but v/as addressed and
referred to as General,
rank.

in deference to his wartime brevet

He was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General on

October 29, 1873.15
General C r o o k ’s assignment to command the D e 
partment of the Platte was in. response to the need foi’ a
capable Indian fighter.
pressive.

C r o o k 1s credentials were im

During' the years of 1871-1375, while commanding

the Department of Arizona, he had pursued, fought, and
“I
defeated the m u r d er ou s•Apaches.'
His victory over the
Southwest tribes was followed by their placement on
reservations.

Although some of the Apaches subsequently

bolted from the reservations and resumed depredations,
C r o o k ’s methods in subjugating them had been noted and
were applied by his successors.
Warfare In the Southwest was characterized by
several features.

The most generally accepted trait of

Apache fighting was the extreme cruelty with which the
Indians treated captives, or the wounded.

The elaborate

atrocities practiced upon these unfortunates were h o r 
rendous because of the fiendish ingenuity displayed in ex
tracting the last ounce of suffering from the victims.

A

less acknowledged characteristic of Apache warfare was the
inability of these desert warriors to unite when faced
with a common enemy.
15

/
\
Marvin ?. Schmitt (ecL )? General George C r o o k .
H 1 s Autob1ography (New e d . 5 Uorman:
University of
Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 183.
•*~°Pbld. 5 pp. 163, 187.
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Between 1871 and 1875, when Crook .commanded the D e 
partment of Arizona,

the Array fought only small groups of

renegade Apaches from the Chiricahua,
Tonto tribes*

As one official stated,

Apache Mohave, and
they were n . . • d i 

vided into about as many tribes as there are families.

rt 17

While this proclivity for division gave them a mobile and
elusive quality,

the small groups of Indians were unable to

withstand attrition, fight off the relentlessly pursuing
.cavalry, and simultaneously support their dependents, who
invariably accompanied them*
A surprising facet of Apache fighting was the suc
cess the Army experienced in recruiting scouts from defeated
bands,

and hope for preferential treatment by the Government

were motives for turning Indian against Indian*

Again,

love

of fighting-~even engaging other Apaches— appeared to be
reason enough for some individual Indians to accept white
m a n ’s pay.

The effectiveness of the Apache scouts was u n 

questioned; no one could trail, or read the subtle signs of
enemy passage as skillfully.

No white scouts could persist

so unflaggingly in pursuit as the natives who seemed im
pervious to the tortures of the Southwest: the body-searing
heat,

suffocating dust of the trail, the stale water of

murky holes, and hot canteens,

or sometines no water for

*}
••'U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2,
p. 450.
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long stretches of the march#
h a d adapted to his inferno#

The Apache,

like the Bedouin,

The v/hite man did not possess

the physical and mental toughness of the desert Indians#
As products of individualistic behavior,
scouts required extremely firm leadership.

the Apache

The A r m y 13 suc

cess in molding these desert wildcats into some semblance
of a partisan body is attributed to the peculiar talents of
A1 Sieber, Crookes Chief of Scouts In Arizona.

Sieber was

unique in commanding the loyalty of his Apaches while- m a i n 
taining undisputed dominance over them*

He possessed the

gift of knowing when trouble was due from one, or several,
of the scouts#

This insight, together with a stern mien

and heavy hand for offenders of his discipline,

accounts

for his success in carrying out General C r o o k 1s policy of
applying Indian against Indian.
Raiding in small groups of warriors from temporary
encampments,

the Apaches could strike with the dispatch of

a lightning bolt and disappear as rapidly#
cessful pursuit,

To achieve suc

General Crook ordered small mobile cavalry

columns on the trail of murdering and horse-stealing
]0
raiders#
Mobility of the cavalry was enhanced by
abolishing the time-honored wagon trains, that normally
18l)3n L# Thrapp, A1 S i e b e r C h i e f of Scouts
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), pp* 173-74.
^Crook,

on. cit# 3 p. 175.

(Norman:
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supported troops and mounts with food, ammunition,.and
essential forage*

Horses subjected to rigorous field duty

required a supplemental ration of corn; well-bred horses
weakened, on a prolonged diet of grass*

The Indian’s

mustangs were adjusted to the scanty fare of their natural
habitat*

To conserve the strength of their war horses,

some warriors--particu.larly the Teton Sioux--took two
horses when on a raid.

A utility horse provided transpor

tation to the battle field, and the prime war horse which
was led to the site of conflict, was mounted only when a
fight was imminent.
In place of the wagon trains,

General Crook borrowed

a page from the miners and early Spanish freighters; he e s 
tablished the mule train as the medium of troop support.
Mules were cantankerous, but tough,

sure-footed, and could

follow the troops into the heart of a desert broken with
arroyos, or into the low boulder-strewn mountains.

An im

portant tactical reason for employing mile trains was to
minimize the telltale dust cloud that marked the advance
of a column when accompanied t>3r a wagon train.

The troops

had to pursue the renegades into rough country because the
Apaches favored broken hills, or mountain terrain, for
raising their temporary camps.

In the event of attack,

braves could engage their enemies in a holding action,
while the families escaped.

the

Success In fighting the Apaches can he attributed to
several factors; first,

the lack of cohesion among the

Indians--even within one band--that resulted in their
fighting as small groups; secondly,

success of the Govern

ment in utilising Apache scouts; and lastly, assuring m o 
bility of cavalry columns by use of mule trains for lo
gistic support.

The commendable results Crook obtained in

dicates the validity of his methods.

Indian scouts and

mule trains would be employed in his subsequent campaigns.
However, fighting small groups of warriors in Arizona might
have deadened, the great Indian fi ghter’s realisation that
other tribes, in other places, could be capable of united
resistance.
Ykhen General Crook moved to Omaha, he assumed a p o 
sition that was invested with considerably more political
and military significance than his previous command.
Department of Dakota,

The

commanded by Brigadier General

Alfred H. Terry, and C r o o k ’s Department of the Platte in
cluded the reservations and hunting grounds of the Teton
Sioux.

These departments were located within a larger

military unit,

the Division of the Missouri,

commanded by

Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan.
George Crook was in a strange fighting environment.
He viould soon appreciate the vast extent of territory over
which the Sioux roamed, and the long marches he would make
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to reach, their encampments*

Extremes in v/eather e n 

countered on the Northern Plains were in contrast to those
experienced in Arizona*

Oppressive temperatures of >the

Southern Deserts wilted men and horses in July and August.
However* during winter campaigns,

the troops of the Dakota

and tire Platte shivered under their blankets when the
temperature dropped to minus thirty degrees Fahrenheit*
General Crook would encounter the increased war p o 
tential of the Sioux.

The demonstrated capability of the

seven tribes of the Tetons to assemble their fighting
forces into large single bodies attests to the social and
political maturity of the Northern Plains Indians.

Common

social and cultural factors of their tribes facilitated
their gathering into confederations in time of war.

20

Sagacious in fighting small bands of Apaches, Crook was
now to be pitted against an enemy who could— as a matter of
official record--fieId one thousand warriors for a single
occasion.

No comment is available concerning C r o o k 1s

opinions regarding the new potential enemy.

Therefore,

it

Is not known whether he was familiar with this important
inf o rma t i o n .
The average Sioux warrior was a remarkable fighting
20

Robert Pennington, MAn Analysis of the Political
Structure of the Teton-Dakota Indian Tribe of North
America,u North Dakota History, XX, No. 5 (July 1955),
pp. 150-55.
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man*

A superb horseman, he was inured to physical dis

comfort,

and unknowing of the word fear.

The Sioux was

the product of a society that heaped adulation on the
fighter in victory,

and assured him a place among his

ancestors if he fell in battle*

Among these warriors, a

system was practiced whereby each coup,
deed, in battle was recognized as a feat,

scalp,

or great

that increased

the prowness and stature of the individual.
magnificent war bonnet of the Plains Indians,

Indeed,

the

comprised of

many eagle feathers, was the crowning glory of the o u t 
standing warrior; each feather was representative of a
notable deed performed in battle.

21

This system of recognition of bravery and adulation
of the fighting man created aggressiveness and desire for
achievement on the battlefield.
for battle honors;

if victorious,

praised, and admired;

Warriors were- competitive
they knew they would be

if they fell in combat, they would be

venerated.

Live or die, they ‘could not lose--it was an un22
beatable 37?rstem among the Plains Indians
In view of the value placed on the Black Hills by the
Sioux,

it is remarkable that this warrior-oriented society

did not react immediately with large scale violence against
^-kfohn G. Bourke, On the B o r de r w 1tb C t o ok (Chicago:
The Rio Grande Press, Inc., 19627, p. 278.
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the intrusion of the Custer and O'enny Expeditions in 1874.
Final breakdown of restraint between the Sioux and the
Government resulted from two factors:

the discovery of gold

in the Black Hills and the failure of the Allison Commission
to negotiate the mining and mineral rights in that area with
the- Indians.

The commission,

appointed by the Secretary of

the Interior on June 18, 1875, was headed by William B.
Allison and was comprised of eight other prominent citizens
including Brigadier General Alfred H* Terry.
The Allison Commission began negotiations on
September 17, 1875, at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, with repre
sentatives of the Brules,
Blackfeet,

Oglalas, Minneconjous, Hunkpapas,

Two Kettles,

Sans Arcs, Lower Brule, Yankton,
23
Santee, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapahoe tribes.
The
Indians were divided into two parties:

the larger was

willing to sell the Black Hills if a satisfactory price
could be obtained; the smaller party, composed of young
warriors, resisted sale for any price.

Turmoil broke out

among the Indians and the lives of the commissioners were
threatened.

Intercession by Young Man Afraid of His. Horses
24
and his warriors prevented bloodshed.
Spotted Tail, the great Brule chief, experienced in
23

U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
the Interior. 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 1875, House Ex* Doc. 1,
Part 5, p. 6 8 8 ,
e 4 Ibld.. p. 689,

Cvi

negotiating with the Government,

requested the commission

to state in writing the terms of their offer*

Finally,

on

the 29th of September, he received the essence of the
Government's proposal: annual rental of mining rights for
$400,000,

or outright purchase for $ 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; also,

purchase of right of way for the Bozeman Trail, or Montana
oc;
Koad, for #50,000 rental annually*
At one time during
negot5_ations, the Indians h a d wanted subsistence for seven
unborn generations*

Later,

they h a d stated a price of

§70,000,000 for complete purchase*

26

Outright relinquishment of title was never seri
ously h o p e d for by the commission.

The Treaty of Laramie

of 1868 stated in Article 12 that no sale or cession of
Indian property would be considered without assent of threefourths of the male Indians*

27

This provision was con

sidered an impossible obstacle to concluding agreement for
sale •
The Indians and the commission failed to reach an
agreement on the Government's offer of September 29, 1875,
for either sale, or rental of mining rights*

This impasse

created an intolerable situation for both parties; the
Government could not resist the political pressure of
2 5 Xbid.,

p. 692-93.

26It>id. . p. 700.

^Kappler, op. cit. , p. 1002.

thwarted miners and the Indians would not tolerate v i o 
lation of their treaty rig ht s•
Resentment against the aggressive Teton Sioux had
been accumulating over a long period within the War De
partment and among certain groups within the Department of
the Interior*

The Northern tribesmen had vigorously re 

sisted subjugation by large military forces commanded by
Brigadier General Henry Sibley in 1862 and Brigadier
General Patrick Conner in 1865* , In smaller confrontations,
typified by'Red C l o u d 1s War, the Indians were victorious in
achieving their ends.
The Treaty of Laramie of 1851 had confirmed Crow
ownership of the rich hunting grounds south of the Y e ll o w 
stone, -between, the Big Horn Mountains and the Powder
River®

28

The Sioux coveted the area and forced the Crows

westward, during the period of 1855-1862,

on

This d i s 

placement created bitter enmity between the Sioux and Crow
tribesmen, and in subsequent- tribal warfare the Sioux had
prevailed*

Indeed, favorite Sioux camping areas, the Big

Horn and Little Big Horn River valleys were on the Crow
Reservation area*

In the summer of 1875, the Sioux were

raiding the Crow Agency and in June, Crows were driven from
28

Kappler, on, c i t *, p. 595,

^ G e o r g e E, Hyde, Red C l o u d 1 s Folk (Norman:
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1957), pp, 8 8 , 92.

Uni
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the Big Horn "by a body of warriors from 1,500 Sioux lodges,,
These depredations against a tribe, e s s e n t i a l l y friendly to
white people,

created dissatisfaction in the Indian Bureau

w ith the Teton Sioux.

One prominent scholar of the causes

of the Sioux War of 1876, Mark H. Brown, avers that the
true origin of the conflict was to be found in ” , • • many
flagrant acts of aggression • • • 11 committed by some Sioux,
50
be tw ee n 1868 and 1876.^

Mr. Brown developed this thesis

from General C r o o k 1 s statement that,

’’The occupation of the

Black Hills country had nothing to do with the hostilities
which have been in progress.” This statement, dated
September 25, 1876, was in the General*s annual report,
rendered after his participation in the gruelling struggles
of the summer which witnessed the Battle of the Rosebud and
C u s t e r 1s defeat at the Little Big Horn.

±

There was no store of good will toward the Sioux
among other tribes and the white people, who were a c 
quainted with Teton aggressiveness.

Tne Sioux War of 1876

h a d its genesis in an incident, rather than the Government!s
accumulated aggravation over a series of. Indian raids.

The

p ro bl em in this case was the deadlock created between the
Government and the Tetons over the negotiations for the
Brown,

on. cit . , p. 22Se

51
v TJ.S . , C ongress, H o u s e , Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong,, 2 d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2 ,
p* 500*

Black 'Hills*

The mechanics for dealing with this situation

h a d been created in the establishment of President G r a n t 1s
Peace Policy of 1869.
The Peace Policy* frequently mistaken for the
Quaker Policy, was simultaneously a credit and a disgrace
to this^Tsption* s history of relations with its Indians,
The Quaker Policy embodied the appointment of Indian agents
from a panel of ministers nominated by religious denomi
nations,

The Peace Policy was concerned with ,f. . * that

body of principles by which the Indian was eventually
pacified and which outlived Quaker participation in Indian
administration,
The essence of the Peace Policy was the location of
the nomadic tribes on designated portions of the great
northern and southern reservations.

This move was neces

sary, not only to clear the way for westward expansion, but
to earnestly institute a program of civilization and
Christianization of the pagan Indians,

Tribesmen who re

mained defiant to the Government were to be placed under
the jurisdiction of the Army,

53

Despite the auspicious plans embodied in the Peace
Policy, affairs did not improve noticeably for the Indians,
^ R o b e r t M, Utley, HThe Celebrated Peace Policy of
General Grant ,u North Dakota H 1story , XX, ifo, 3 (May, 1953),
p. 126.
~
■
■*"

Religious ministers were placed in charge of reservations
as agents; not only Quakers, hut also pastors of other de
nominations,

Some p r o v e d ,incapable of management and

others, far removed from religious restraint, became sus
piciously wealthy in handling reservation supplies,

A

program was initiated whereby peaceful Indians were to be
assisted in accomplishing the transition from the nomadic
life to the idyl3_Ic pursuit of agriculture.
implements,

Insufficient

draft animals, and supervision were provided at

some reservations.

Drought and grasshoppers often consumed

the pitiful crops.

The frailties of the white m a n ’s

character and the weakness of his vaunted agricultural
system were duly observed by the Indians;

it was no wonder

that large numbers of them chose to stay away from the
re se r.va t i on s •
The punitive provision of the Pes.ce Policy provided
the fulcrum for initiating the Sioux War of 1876.

The

lever that initiated military action against the Tetons was
the Black Hills impasse.
and March,

Events between September,

1875,

1876, demonstrates the Government of President

Grant moved surely and knowingly toward an armed con
frontation with the Indians.
After the failure of the Allison Commission to con
clude an agreement with the Sioux,

the military patrols

assigned to-keep miners and prospectors from flooding the
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~
'54black Hills were withdrawn.
poured Into the’ Hills.

Immediately, venturous men

On November. 5, 1875, a mysterious

m eeting was convened at the White House.

One news dispatch

stated;
The president, Secretary Belknap, Generals Sherman
and Crook h a d a private interview yesterday regarding
Indian matters in general and the Black Hills in o a r -.
t i c u l a r . At the close, Secretary Chandler and General
CoY/an were sent for and the subject was discussed
further.
The result of this conference is that the
government will preserve a neutral position towards the
miners who are crowding into the Black Hills in great
numbers*
Pour hundred men left Cheyenne a few days ago
for the gold fields, and it may be said positively that
they will not be molested by the troops.
General Crock
says that miners are crowding in from all directions,
and that it Is Impossible to keep them o u t . ^
Captain John G. Bourke,

General C r o o k ’s aide and

mentor, makes oblique reference to this meeting in his work,
On the Border w i t h C r o o k :
General Crook said that at the council where General
Grant h a d decided that the northern Sioux should go upon
their reservation or be whipped, there w e r e present
Secretary of the Interior Chandler, Assistant Secretary
Cowan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Smith and
Secretary of War Belknap.
Ho reference is made to President G r a n t ’s high level
conference In the official documents related to the Sioux
War of 1876.

Instead,

the official springboard for v/ar, as

Bi
^ 'Hob .1n s o n , o p . clt ., p • 421.
^5
^ Harry H. Anderson, nA Challenge to B r o w n rs Sioux
Ind i an War s The sis,:I Montana lip,gag in e of Western Hi st or y,
XII, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 46.
jfy

s?

° Bourke, op. cit,, p. 287.
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cited in War Department Reports of 1876, was the report
submitted by Inspector S.. C, Watkins to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs*

This report was dated November 9, 1875,

or six days after the White House conference.

The

following statement from this report was to embody the
G o v e r n m e n t s repressive measures against the Indians:
And yet these hostile, renegade Indians number, all
told, but a few hundred v/arriors and these are never
all together or under the control of one chief.
In my judgement, one thousand men, under the command
of an experienced officer, sent into their country in
the winter, when the Indians are nearly always in camp,
and at which season of the year they are almost h e l p 
less, would be amply sufficient for their capture or
punishment. . . . The true policy, in my judgement, Is
to send troops against them in the winter, the sooner
the better, and whip them into subjection®
They
richly merit the punishment for their incessant warfare
on friendly tribes, their continuous thieving, and
their numerous murders of white settlers and their
families, or y/hite men wherever found unarmed.
On December 5, 1875, Zachariah Chandler,
of the Interior, notified William W. Belknap,

Secretary

Secretary of

War, that he had directed the hostile Sioux Indians, r e 
siding outside reservations,
by January 51, 1876.
failed to comply,

to proceed to the reservations

They were also informed that if they

n * . . they will be reported to the War

Department as hostile

Indians, and that a military force

will be sent to compel them to obey the orders of the
37

U.S., Co ngress, H o u s e , Military Expedition Against
the Sioux Indians, 44th Cong*, 1st Sess*, 3.876, House Ex.
Doc. 184, pp, 8-9.
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These instructions reached the agents at Sioux reser
vations after mid-December;

specifically,

the Cheyenne River

Agency on December 20, and the Standing Rock Agency on
December 2 2 , 1875.

A messenger dispatched from the Cheyenne

A.gency was not able to complete the notification and return
to the Agency until February 11, 1876.

He reported that the

Indians received the message in good humor,

some replying

that they were in the midst of hunting and would come to the
agencies in the spring.

The severity of the winter u n 

doubtedly dissuaded some of the bands from making the
journey across the bleak landscape,

on skeletal ponies,

that

were half starved from the insufficient forage of the frozen
plain.

Other bands displayed a manana attitude; besides,

why should the Great Father attack them?

They were perfectly

within their rights to hunt outside the reservation, as long
as they remained on the unceded lands, that had been defined
In the Treaty of Laramie of 1868.

There was every reason for

them to be hunting at this time because the agencies had run
go
short of provisions.
When January 51, 1876, arrived and only several bands
of Indians h a d returned to the reservations,

the mechanics

for instituting Government reprisals were set in motion.
^A

I bid. , p. 10.

Robinson, op. clt.}.p. 422.

On February 7, 1876, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan
received authority, by General S he rman’s endorsement on a
letter from the Secretary of the Interior, to commence
operations against the hostile Sioux®

Generals Crook and

Terry were notified to carry out the request of the
Secretary of the Interior, but specific orders were not
Issued because of the uncertainty of the location of the
AO
Indians®*

General Terry was Informed that General Crook

would operate in the vicinity of the headwaters of the
Powder River, Tongue River, Rosebud, and Big Horn Rivers,
where the wildest of the Tetons--Crazy H o r s e ’s and Sitting
Bull*'s b a nd s— were known to frequent.

Geographical lines

of departmental division were to be ignored until objectives
were attained.

During the initial phases of direction and

planning at General Sheridan1s Headquarters in Chicago,
Illinois,

concerted actions between the two departmental

commanders were not required.

41

In light of the vast

distances involved and severe weather experienced by
General T e r r y ’s troops,

coordinated actions would have

been impossible in the first stage of action against the
Sioux.
S,,
War, 44th Cong®,
p . 441.

41

Ibid.

2d

Sess.,

Congress, H o u s e , Report of the Secretar
1876, House Ex® Doc. 1 , Part 2,

CHAPTER II
THE ATTACK ON CRAZY HORSE VILLAGE

Preparations for.the Big Horn Expedition,

the

official designation of the first campaign of the Sioux War
of 3.876, were undertaken immediately on receipt of in
structions by General Crook.

The purpose of the expedition

was to enforce Teton compliance with the Secretary of In
terior 1 s order that the non-reservation Sioux return to the
agencies®

Ten full companies of cavalry, from the Second

and Third Cavalry Regiments, and two infantry companies of
the Fourth Infantry Regiment were drawn from Forts Laramie
and D. A. Russell*

Fort Fetterman was designated as the

concentration point for the troops,

supplies, wagons,

and

pack -trains
The fighting forces were assembled into six b a t 
talions, each cavalry battalion being comprised cf two
cavalry companies,

and the two infantry companies were

organized as an infantry battalion.

Command and composition

cf the battalions were as follows: the First Battalion was
comprised of Companies E and M, of the Third-Cavalry, com
manded by Captain Anson Mills;

(Norman:

Second Battalion, Companies

W . V a u g h n , The Reynolds. Campaign on Powder River
University cf Oklahoma Press, IS61).-, p. 9*
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A and D, Third Cavalry,

commanded by Captain William

Hawley; Third Battalion,

Companies I and K, Second Cavalry,

commanded by Captain Henry E. Noyes; Fourth Battalion,
Companies A and B, Second Cavalry,
T. B. Dewees; Fifth Battalion,

commanded by Captain

comprised of Company E,

Second Cavalry and Company F, Third Cavalry,

commanded by

Captain Alexander Moore; Sixth Battalion, Companies C and I,
Fourth Infantry,

commanded by Captain E. M. Coates.

2

The column consisted of thirty officers, 662 e n 
listed men, and 191 civilian employees engaged as scouts,
wagoneers, and packers.
was 883 men.

Total strength of the expedition

Less than half of the column1s personnel

were to be actively engaged with the Indians.

3

Logistic support was provided by eighty,

six-mule

v/agons and a pack train assembled in five divisions of
eighty mules to each division.

Cargo of the v/agon train

consisted primarily of forage that was to maintain the
A
strength of the cavalry horses and pack m u l e s . x
Major efforts were made to protect personnel from
the extremely cold weather that would be encountered.
skin or woolen underwear were donned;

several pairs of

stockings of lamb!s wool covered the feet;
2 lb I d .,

p. 26, 191-99.

^Ibld. , p. 26-27.
a

B o u r k s , o p.

c i t ., p . 254.

Buck

sturdy boots or

S3

leggings of buffalo hide, with the fur turned inward,
covered the legs -and feet.

Heavy double-breasted shirts

and blouses were worn under overcoats of buffalo, bearskin,
or beaver.

As long as the wagon train accompanied the

column, cork mattresses,

comforters,
5
were available as bedding.

and buffalo robes

The troops were under the immediate command of
Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds,

of the Third Cavalry Regiment,

General Crook accompanied the expedition, primarily to
observe the feasibility of campaigning on the northern
plains in the winter.

Relations between General Crook and

Colonel Reynolds were described by Lieutenant Bourke:
r

Crook was very kindly disposed towards General
Reynolds, and wanted to give him every chance to make a
brilliant reputation for himself and retrieve the past.
Reynolds had been in some kind of trouble in the
Department of Texas, of which he had been the commander,
and as a consequence of this trouble, whatever it was,
had been relieved of the command and ordered to rejoin
his regiment # 0
Concurrent with the preparations being advanced
within the Department of the Platte, were the attempts by
elements of General T e r r y Ts Department of Dakota to mount a
column against Sitting Bull.

That wily chieftain*s band

was presumed to be encamped on the Little Missouri River.
It was later discovered 'that he and his people were on the
^Ibid., p. *252-53.

6Xbid., p. 270.
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Dry Fork of the Missouri, approximately two h undred miles
farther vie st.
General Terry* s plan required concentration of d e 
tached companies of the Seventh Cavalry at Fort Abraham
Lincoln, near Bismark,

Dakota Territory*

were moving to Fort Lincoln,

While the troops

the season became so inclement

that a great number of men were frostbitten*

Because of

the extreme cold and deep snow, Sheridan cancelled Terry*s
portion of the plan*

7

On February 27, Terry had ordered

Colonel John Gibbon, Commander of the District of Montana,
to move as many troops as he could spare to the Yellowstone
valley*

Gibbon*s force finally reached Fort Pease, near

the m o ut h of the Big Horn on April 20, 1876*
h a d b e e n delayed,

Since Terry

Gibbon was instructed to remain at Pease

and coordinate future movements with the Dakota Column.
Prior to departure of the Platte Column from Fort
Fetterman, Black Coal, an Arapahoe chief,

told Crook that

the hostiles were encamped on the lower Powder River, about
8
150 miles f rom Fetterman-#.
General Crook and the scouts
f ormed the vanguard as the column marched briskly from B'ort
9
Fetterman on March 1 , 1876.
The scouts were led by Frank
7

U.S., Congress, House, Report of Secretary of War,
44th Gong., 2 d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Pp,rt 2, p. 442*
Bourke,

op* c l t . , p* 250.

^Ibid., p. 254-55.

■f
i
a-’5

/

UJ

=O
3B
_
C
.

>*'•*<•I**
•
'

U.

r

'>1

vi o
c%.."£ —*b3o'V

I
^

^

\ ,J '
Vf

p. fM
v
v«
Vi

^
o, -fx .jfc'
-r r

p j

Grouard, who claimed to he a Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islander.
Others declared hi m to he the son of a French Creole father
and an Oglala woman.
of Frank Grouard . ^ 0

His name was Walter Brazeau,

Instead

Although suspected by some officers of

possessing conflicting loyalties, between white people and
the Sioux, Grouard was generally an efficient scout and
enjoyed the confidence of General Crook*

11

He rendered

valuable service to the United States Army in the year of
1876.
It was evident from nocturnal rifle fire into the
encamped troops that the column was under observation by the
Indians.

On the evening of March 1 , the Indians stampeded

the cattle herd toward Fort Fetterman and forty-five head
could not be recovered.

Abandoned Fort Reno,

the first

major landmark during the march, was reached on March 5,

1876c
On March 7, tne wagon train and infantry battalion
were left at Crazy W o m a n 1s Fork of the Powder River.

The

ten cavalry companies and the pack train continued with
fifteen days rations.

The wagon train, accompanied by the

infantry returned to Fort Reno on March 9, and there awaited
the return of the fighting force
10Mari Sandoz, Crazy Horse (Bison Book; Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 426.
■^Vaughn,
12

op. c i t . , p. 58.

Ibid., p. 205.
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During March. 8 through. March 16, the column con
tinued its advance to the Powder River.

On March 16, two

Indians, later ascertained to be members of a hunting party
of thirty or forty braves, v/ere observed at some distance
f rom the advanced scouting party.

General Crook desired to

create an impression among the hunters that the column was
not interested in their trail.

He therefore directed the

command to halt and bivouac on Otter Creek.

The General

ordered the column to be divided into two parts.
element u n d e r Colonel Reynolds,

The major

consisted of a combat force

of about 300 m e n comprised of the First, Third, and Fifth
Battalions,

or six cavalry companies, accompanied by Frank

Grouard and a portion of the scouts.

This force was de 

tailed to p e r f o r m a night march eastward to Powder River.
The balance of the column,
up of the p a c k train,

commanded by General Crook, made

accompanied by the Second and Fourth

Battalions, was to proceed to Lodge Pole Creek on the Powder
Hiver.

At that point, Colonel Reynolds* force would unite

with the smaller portion of the command .-*-3

If the combat

force sighted an Indian village,

it was to be attacked;

If

nothing u n t o w a r d was discovered,

the forces would rendezvous

as planned.
General Crook was criticized for dividing his command
and^sending only six companies of cavalry after the
Indians.
W h e n asked his reason for this action during

13

Ibid., p. -59-61.

subsequent court-martial proceedings against Colonel
Reynolds, he replied: ” It was so very cold and the
ground was frozen and it was very difficult for the
animals to go up an incline of ten degrees#
It was
so smooth after a few had gone over it, making it
impossible to take the pack train, so the command
was divided # 11
Colonel Reynolds stated, at a later period, he u n d e r 
stood the purpose of the attack was to capture the village,
accomplish maximum attrition among the Indians, run off the
pony herds, and create as much havoc as possible#

General

Crook averred that he specifically directed Colonel Reynolds
to sa.ve poi-’tions of the Indian* s provisions,
u se d by the troops#

that could be

General C r o o k ’s statement was denied

b y Colonel Reynolds, who claimed no specific orders were
issued and he proceeded to create maximum damage through
the employment of troops and methods as required In his
judgment# ^
The combat force of three battalions was on the trail
at five o*clock in the afternoon of March 16, and stumbled
throughout the night, after the hoof marks left by the
Indian hunting party#

As the dawn light became stronger,

a

column of smoke was seen in the distance signaling the
probable location of an Indian village#
halted,

While the column

the scouts went forward to pinpoint the site of the

encampment#

At seven o*clock they returned and reported the

^ Ikid. , p# 61#
~^Ibid#
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results of their reconnaissance.

A village of approximately

105 teepees was located within a bend of the Powder River,
on the left, or west hank, and at the foot of the heights
on which the combat force had halted.

Trees, brush, and

boulders were interspersed among the lodges#

Five, pony

herds were grazing on the eastern perimeter of the village#
Colonel Reynolds 1 plan of attack, which was well
initiated,

involved three basic,

concerted movements.

The

Third Battalion, with Captains Henry E. Noyes and James Egan
as company commanders, was to move first; Egan wa.s to charge
the village with pistols and Noyes-was to drive off the pony
herds.

The First Battalion, with Captain Mills and First

Lieutenant John B. Johnson as company commanders, was to
move in after E g a n !s charge, occupy the village and destroy
it.

The Fifth Battalion, under company commanders Captain

Moore and First Lieutenant William B# Rawclle, was to move
close to the west side of the village and take positions on
a ridge overlooking the encampment.

This was a vantage

point where the Fifth Battalion could not only lay enfi
lading fire, but could deny the warriors use of the same
advantage during an attempted counterattack.

18

As the attacking column neared the village,
sighted by a youthful pony herder.

it was

Eis ringing war whoop

aroused the drowsy Indians, who poured from, the teepees in
16~
Jbourke, op. e i t . , p a 272.

various stages of savage d ishabille»

The warriors returned

a spirited rifle fire at the horsemen of Captain E g a n 1s
Company K, as they swept in among the teepees with blazing
pistols-.

Ali the battalions fulfilled their orders and the

village was soon ablaze.

Great quantities of dried meat,

saddles, fixed ammunition,

loose gun powder,

gorgeous ceremonial regalia,
buffalo robes were destroyed.

clothing,

and beautifully embroidered
Tent poles,

teepee covers,

and miscellaneous contents soared skyward, as if erupting
from Vesuvius, when quantities of stored gun powder deto, 17
nated.
When the Fifth Battalion moved to the ridge over
looking the village at the onset of the attack, Captain
Moore did not extend his troops in a skirmish line long,
enough to prevent the warriors from occupying the north end
of the same ridge.

From this position,

the Indians not

only directed an effective rifle fire at the troops d e 
stroying their village, but threatened to flank M o o r e ’s
1o
position.
Destruction of the village was completed and
as the fire from the Indians along the ridge increased,
Colonel. Reynolds ordered evacuation and withdrawal.
Immediately,
Creek,

the combat fore© proceeded to Lodge Pole

to rendezvous with General C r o o k ’s portion of the
17

Ibid., p. 276-77.

^Vaughri, op. cit., p . 101.
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'expedition.
presented.
six wounded.

No estimate of Indians killed,

or wounded was

Colonel Reynolds* force lost four killed and
19

Some confusion exists among various authors r e 
garding identification of the Indian village*

Bourke,

in

*

On the Border with Crook relates:
In one of the lodges was found a wounded squaw, who
stated that she had been struck in the thigh in the very
beginning of the fight as her husband was firing out
from the entrance to the lodge.
She stated that this
was the band of f,Crazy Horse, *' who had with him a force
of the Minneconjou Sioux, but that the forty new canvas
lodges clustered together at the extremity by which we
had entered belonged to some Cheyennes who had recently
arrived from the “Red C l ou d 11 A g e n c y . ^
Another author states the village was predominantly
Cheyenne, under the leadership of Two Moon.

pi

Writers who

dispute B o u r k e *s statements may not appreciate the im
portance of Crazy Horse,

or the degree of esteem he enjoyed

among his people--both m en and women--as a paramount war
leader.

If the headman of the village was Crazy Horse,

the

woman would have known and undoubtedly been proud tc ac
knowledge membership in his band.
At sundown on March 17, Reynolds* force reached the
assembly point in an exhausted and famished condition.
1 9 Ifcld.,

On

pp. 212-13.

20sourko, op. c i t ., pp. 276-77.
23
‘Stanley Vestal, Sitting Bull, Champion of the Sioux
(New ed; Norman:
University of" Oklahoma Press, 1957),
p. 140.

departing from General Crook,

trie combat force had taken

one d a y 1 s ration which was generally consumed before
reaching the rendezvous*

The troops and most of the horses

h a d received very little rest over a thirty-six hour period,
or from the time of breaking camp on the morning of
March 16, until they paused at Lodge Pole Creek*

During

that period they h a d fought a battle and marched seventythree miles in extreme cold©

22

The captured pony herd estimated at 400 to 700 h ea d
was allowed to graze along the Powder Paver, away from the
troop horses*

Colonel Reynolds stated that his me n were so

tired he could assure maximum security only for the cavalry
animals,

in the event the Indians made a night attack,

regain their most prized possessions*

to

Although, no Indians

were detected in the camp vicinity, most of the he rd was
gone on the morning of March 18*

23

About noon of March 18, General Crook arrived in camp
with nearly 1 0 0 conies he h a d recovered from Indians who had
raided R ey no ld s! camp*

He was initially gratified to learn

the attack had been completed; to discomfit Crazy Horse and
his b a n d was particularity pleasing to the General.

However,

he was disappointed to learn that during withdrawal from the
village,

tv/o soldiers— one still alive--were left on enemy
po

Vaughn,
load*

op. c i t . , p. 213.«

ground and that Indian food supplies and robes were d e 
stroyed*

Loss of the pony herd was considered inexcusable

by the G e n e r a l * ^
Return to Fort Fetterman began on March 19.

Indians,

shadowing the column, harassed the troops at night by firing
random shots at the camp fires* . Since the primary aim of
the Sioux and Cheyennes was to regain the ponies Crook had
captured,

the General ordered the mounts destroyed*

To dis

courage the Indians from endangering the camp.with wild rifle
fire,

the scouts killed fifty horses by cutting their

throats.

The Indians at once recognized the pitiful sounds

of the dying beasts and retired with a departing volley and
defiant yells.

05

The five battalions joined the wagon train

and infantry at old Fort Reno on March 21*

No attacks h ad

been made on the rear element during the cavalry's absence.
Having re st ed the command during March 2 2 , the complete
expedition departed Fort Reno on March 23.

Fort Fetterman

was reached on March 26, and the Big Horn Expedition was
dissolved on March 2 7 . ^ 6
C on tinued exposure to the harsh winter h a d resulted
in approximately sixty-six cases of frostbitten noses,
hands,

and feet.
24

Two cases of inflammatory rheumatism were

B o u r k e , op.

c i t . t p 9 280.

ibid., pp. 280-81.
O hj
" Vaughn, op* cit. , p e 214.

reported.

Temperatures as low as minus twenty-three

degrees and minus tv/enty-six degrees Fahrenheit were
reported on March 11 and 12, respectively.

27

W. T. Sherman, General of the Army, reported to the
Secretary of War that inconclusive results v/ere achieved by
the expedition.

His statements reflected the dis

satisfaction of General Crook w it h Reynolds 1 performance.
Colonel Reynolds was acutely aware of his commander1s pique
and requested in his report to the Commander of the Depart
ment of the Platte,
vestigated.

29

that his conduct of the attack be in-

To his intense chagrin,

charges were preferred against him.

court-martial

Through these charges,

his capacity to exercise sound judgment was assailed and his
veracity i m p u g n e d . ^

As if to protect hiraself, he in turn

preferred charges against Captain Moore and Captain Noyes.
Moore,

through failure to adequately support the troops who

destroyed the village, faced charges of cowardice before the
enemy.

SI

Noyes, because he permitted his men to unsaddle

07

^ U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2,
p. 29.
2 8 Ibid.

OQ
30

Vaughn, op. c i t ., p. 213*

War Department, Record Group 94, File 6160 A d j u 
tant General*s. Office 1875, powder River Expedition.
(Adjutant G en eral’s Office is hereafter cited as AGO.)
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and make coffee during the skirmishing in the village,, was
52
charged .with neglect of duty before the enemy, ^
Captain Noyes was the only defendant who emerged
from the trials with his reputation intact©

Moore was not

found guilty of cowardice, hut was judged guilty of the
charge of conduct prejudicial to good order and military
•Z *2

discipline.

Regardless of the phrasing, Moore*s career
5A

was ruined and h e resigned in 1879.

"

The trial of Colonel

Reynolds was punctuated with hitter statements against his
detractors and disputes with General Crook regarding in
structions the General maintained he delivered verbally to
Reynolds*

Hence,

the case appears to rest on one man*s word

against the other*s.

Reynolds was found guilty of not

obeying the Departmental Commander*s orders and was sentenced
to be suspended from rank and command for one y e a r * ^

Subse

quently, he was notified that President Grant ha d remitted
the sentence*

As with Captain Moore,

Reynolds could not

overcome the stigma of substandard conduct and retired in
56
1877, f o r physical disability.
3 2 ibid„
33IbM.

■
34.
'Vaughn, op.

cit . 9 p. 186.

War Department, Record Group 94, Pile 6160 AGO
1875,. Powder River Expedition.
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Vaughn,

op

.

cit, , p. 178.

The treatment of Reynolds and Moore may appear some
what drastic*

However,

General Crook faced the necessity

of tightening officer discipline when the enlisted men
muttered a.gainst their leaders for permitting a wounded' man
to be captured by the Indians*

Troop morale, on future cam

paigns, would have been seriously compromised unless he
moved to correct deficiencies in leadership*

All defendants

possessed excellent records of brave and faithful service
during the Civil War*

Reynolds,

a brilliant man, had

served as Professor of Engineering at Washington University
in St* Louis, Missouri.

Examination of the minute details

of the conflict at Crazy Horse village,

reveals the im

possibility of completing all phases of General C r o o k 1s
verbal orders,

If given.

Captain Anson Mills stated in his summary of the
action,

11Owing

to the age and feebleness of Colonel Reynolds

and the bitter feud that existed In our regiment

(the Third

Cavalry)

• • . , this attack on the village on Powder River
, 57
proved a lamentable failure.1.
Although Colonel Reynolds
was only fifty-four at this time, he may have aged rapidly
under the burdens of frontier- military life.

Captain Mills*

words intimate the existence of a controversy within the
Third Cavalry prior to the expedition.

ington :

Neither the subject

■^^Anson Mills, My S t o r y , ed. C, H. Claudy (Wash
Pre ss of Byron S . A da ms , 1918), p . 166.
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of the feud., or the names of the officers who were parties
thereto are discussed in his hook.
The United States Array in the nineteenth century
was a likely organization in which to incur official
censure.

Rugged conditions created a necessity for hard

discipline, among personnel with highly individualistic
characters.

J. W. Vaughn presents the situation clearly:

It was inevitable that men of strong personalities
would clash, when cooped up within the narrow confines
of the frontier posts.
Officers spent much of their
time sitting as judges during trials of court-martial
proceedings.
Often three or more families w o u ld live
in the same house under very primitive conditions,
which gave rise to many petty conflicts.
There are
many cases of officers being discharged or forced to
resign because of personal spite and jealousy.
I have
been told by retired army officers that there are but
few career officers who have not at some time been
tried by court-martial for some petty offense. . . . .
The phrase "conduct unbecoming a.n officer and a
gentleman 11 covered a wide variety of real or fancied
sins.
The rigid moral code of personal conduct during
the period made it possible for the most innocent act
to be misconstrued, and the small garrisons were h o t 
beds of gossip, talebearing, and personal feuds.
Colonel Reynolds h a d many friends and his courtmartial undoubtedly damaged C r o o k 1s image In. their eyes.
Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall,

one of Reynolds*

sub

ordinates in the Third Cavalry Regiment appears to have
carried his resentment against Crook for many years.

In the

subsequent Battle of the Rosebud, a near disastrous ba tt l e 
field condition arose from the wide separation in the
^p

Vaughn, op. cit . s p. 175.
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tactical positions assumed by Crook and Royall.

Lack of

cooperation may have "been motivated by R o y a l l 1s resentment.
Even with the failure to achieve the detailed r e 
quirements of General Crook,

the destruction of Crazy Horse

village yielded one important- military lesson; winter cam
paigns could be conducted.

Although Army combat forces

would experience extreme discomfort, winter attacks were to
be disastrous for the Indians.

Women and children would be

without shelter, and food would be difficult to obtain with,
winter-weakened ponies.

There is no evidence the Indians

were awed by these implications,
defiance of the Army.

judging from their resolute

The successes of Red C l o u d 1s War

during 1866-68, provided an incentive to fight for their
convictions.
1876.

General Crook would have s. h ar d summer in

CHAPTER III
BATTLE OF THE ROSEBUD
Continuation of the Government’s punitive policy
against the militant portion of the Teton Sioux was u n 
questionably necessary after Reyn ol ds ’ attack on the Crazy
Horse village.

Inconclusive results,

as referred to In

General S h e rm an ’s report to the Secretary of War,

alluded

to failure in accomplishing a basic objective--forcing the
recalcitrant Indians onto the reservations.

Sioux and

Cheyenne inhabitants of the destroyed village became h a r 
bingers of the Government’s hardened resolution against
nomadic people who wished to live alone and removed from
the white m a n ’s way*
Preparations for additional thrusts against the n o n 
reservation Tetons inaugurated a series of movements that
were to be described as the Big Horn and Yellowstone Ex p e
dition.

Approval for continuing the action was considered

by General Sheridan to be embodied in the directive of
February,

1875,

that authorized the Big Horn Ex pedition . 1

The Lieutenant General commanding the Division of the M i s 
souri and the General of the Army were in rapport
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concerning the requirement for continued action and appear
to have considered extensive discussion of this subject
unnecessary.
Movement of troops and supplies were underway in May
of 1876 to effect the concentrationo required for the threepronged plan of attack favored by Sheridan and Sherman*
This tactic h a d been successfully employed in 1874-75
against the hostile Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne tribesmen
of the Southern plains*

General Sheridan ordered 11* * •

three distinct columns to be prepared to move to a common
center, where the hostiles were supposed to be . • • *,!^
Personnel for the columns were drawn from the De
partments of the Platte and Dakota*

Points of origin for

the troops and supplies were in Montana,
North Platte,

Dakota, and on the

The three columns were to move simultaneously

against the Indian encampment,

thus decreasing the likeli

h ood of their avoiding interception.
General of the Army,

In a letter to the

dated May 29, 1876,

General Sheridan

stated:
The organization of these commands and what they
expect to accomplish has been as yet left to the de
partment commanders.
I presume that the following
will occur:
General Terry will drive the Indians toward the Big
Horn Valley, and General Crook will drive them back
toward Terry; Colonel Gibbon moving down on the north
side of the Yellowstone to intercept. If possible,
such as may want to go north of the Missouri to the

2Ibld., p. 29*
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Milk River*
The result of the movement of these three columns
may force many of the hostile Indians hack to the
agencies on the Missouri River and to the Red Cloud
and Spotted Tail agencies on the northern line of
Nebraska, where nearly every Indian, man, woman, and
child, is at heart a friend*
General Sherman opined that the troops would not encounter more than 500 to 800 warriors*
Sioux warriors,

4

This estimate of

considered as being representative of the

non-reservation Teton strength, was credited to the Indian
Bureau*

These figures are an understatement of such gross

magnitude that one is amazed at their acceptance by the
highest military circles.

Depreciation of Sioux capa

bilities underscores the A r m y Ts record of engagement with
these dynamic plainsmen.*

Destruction of C u s t e r ’s scouting

fdrbe d'nd the near-defeat of C r o o k Ts major column was the
price paid during the Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition
for over-confidence when engaging the Sioux.
Colonel John Gibbon,

leader of the Montana Column,

h i d been ordered by General Terry,’ on February 27, to
participate in' the Big Horn Expe'ditlon.

His force,' a s 

sembled at Fort E l l i s y near Bozeman/ Montana Territory/
U.S., C o ng re ss , H o u s e , Military Expedition Against
the --Si on x Ind.1 an s , 44th Cong., 1st Ses s. , 1876, House Ex.
Doc. 184, pp. 53-54.
A.'
_
- — D/S// Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
W a r / 44th Cong., 2 d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2 ,
p.' 29/

consisted of four companies of the Second Cavalry Regiment
commanded by Major James S. Brisbin and six companies of the
Seventh Infantry Regiment,
Freeman,

commanded by Captain Henry B.

The column was accompanied by a twelve-pound

Napoleon field gun and two, fifty calib^eB Gatling guns.
Transportation was provided by twenty-four government and
twelve civilian contract wagons.

Total strength of the

Montana Column was about 478 men,

including twenty-seven

officers,

406 enlisted men and twenty civilian teamsters.

First Lieutenant James H. Bradley,

the soldier-author was

in charge of twenty-three Crow Indians, who had been enlisted as scouts,

and two squaw-men interpreters,

G i b b o n Ts force departed Fort Ellis on March SO, and
had bivouaced at Fort Pease, opposite the mouth of the Rose
bud, from April 20, until May 10, 1875,

The delay at Fort

Pease had been caused by the inability of the Dakota Column
to move westward In March,
Horn Expedition.

1876, and participate in the Big

It was anticipated some of the Sioux

would cross the Yellowstone to escape the pressure of the
converging Dakota and Platte Columns,

Until he joined with

Terry on June 9, Gibbon guarded the north bank of the
Yellowstone River and dispatched patrols through the
5

James H, Bradley,. The March of the Montana C o l u m n ,
ed, Edgar I. Stewart (New e d . ; Norman:
University of
Oklahoma Press, 1961), p. 50.
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0
Yellowstone Valley.
General Terry* s' Dakota Column was concentrated at
Fort Ab ra h am Lincoln.

His force comprised of the twelve

companies of the Seventh Cavalry Regiment,

two companies of

the Seventeenth Infantry Regiment, four companies of the
Sixth Infantry,

and forty Indian scouts.

A battery of three

potent Gatling guns, manned by detachments from the Twenti
eth Infantry Regiment, was attached to the column and gener
ally supported the Seventh Cavalry.
column was 1,200 men.

Total strength of the

A scouting force of forty Indians,

mostly Arickaras, was under Bobtailed Bull and Included
C u s t e r 1s favorite

scout, Bloody Knife.

The supply train,

consisting of .150 wagons, v/as accompanied by a beef herd.

7

Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Custer was first assigned
to command the Dakota Column, but was later relegated to com
m and only his regiment,

the Seventh Cavalry.

Custer had b e 

come embroiled in an acrimonious political dispute concerning
the malfeasance of W, W. Belknap,

Secretary of War.

testifying before a Senate Investigating Committee,

In
C u s t e r 1s

statements reflected adversely on President G r a n t 1s a d 
m in istration and implicated Orvil Grant,

the P r e s i d e n t s

£*
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th. Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. l , ’Part~2,
p. 472.

7

Brown, o p . cit.» p. 255.

b r o t h e r *8

G r a n t ’s displeasure was manifested in official

harassment of Custer; he was ignored by the President when
he tried to apologize; he was arrested in Chicago, during
his return to Bismark, for failure to sign the departing
officers* register at the War Department*

Only by inter

vention of the gentlemanly Terry was Custer permitted to
participate in the expedition--and certainly not as
Commander of the Dakota Column*
B o t h the Montana and the Dakota Columns relied on
wagon trains for the movement of supplies*

No real capa

bility for management of pack trains had been developed in
the Department of Dakota*

9

The wagon train of the Dakota

Column carried about 250 pack saddles,
mules of the w a g o n train,

to be u se d on the

if the need should arise.

Re

supply of T e r r y ’s and G i b b o n ’s columns was to be provided
by steamboat delivery of provisions to a point on the
Yellowstone known as S t a n le y’s Stockade, near the mouth of
Glendive Creek*

10

On the morning of May 17, the Dakota Column departed
0

Robert C. Prickett, ’’The Malfeasance of William
Worth B e l k n a p , ” North Dakota Elstory, XVII, No. 1
(January 1950), p. 50.
9
U.S., Congress, -House, Report of the Secretary of
W a r , 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876‘, House'Ex. Doc. “l7"Tart7~2,
p. 460*
1 0 Xfoid.

Fort Abraham Lincoln to join the Montana Column on the
south bank of the Yellowstone at the Glendive Creek supply
depot.

Progress was extremely slow because the heavily

laden wagon trains h a d difficulty on trails softened by
spring rains*
General C r o o k ’s forces had concentrated at Fort
D. A. Russell, Wyoming- Territory,

and at Medicine Bow,

ninety miles west of the Union Pacific Railroad.
wagons,

Troops,

and pack trains from these points were united on

May 25, 1876, at Fort Fetterman,
Column.^

to become the Platte

The primary subordinate commanders,

immediately

under General Crook were Lieutenant Colonel W. 3. Royall,
Third Cavalry Regiment,
Infantry Regiment*

and Major Alex Chambers, Fourth

Lieutenant Colonel Royall was desig

nated as Commander of Cavalry,

and Major Chambers was

appointed Commander of Infantry.
Major A. H. Evans,

Third Cavalry Regiment,,was

Lieutenant Colonel R o y a l l ’s subordinate in command of the
ten companies of the Third Cavalry that were assigned to
the expedition.

These companies, or troops, were divided

into three battalions.

Command and composition of the

battalions were as follows:
First Battalion: Commander, Captain Anson Mills.
■^J* W. Vaughn, With Crook at the Rosebud
(Harrisburg:
The Stackpole Co., 1956), pp. 4-5.
(Hereafter cited as Vaughn, At the Ro sebud. )

Comp any

A, commanded by First Lieutenant Joseph Lawson.

Conioany

E, commanded by Captain Alexander Sutorious.

Company

X, commanded by Captain Wi ll ia m H. Andrews.

Company

M, commanded by Captain Anson Mills.
Second Battalion: Commander, Captain Guy V. Henry.

Company

B, commanded by Captain Charles Meinhold.

Company

F, commanded by Second Lieutenant Bainbridge

Reynolds.

Company L, commanded by Captain Peter D* Vroom.

Thi rd Battalion: Commander, Captain Frederick Van
Vliet.

Company C, commanded by Captain Van Vliet.

Company G, commanded by First Lieutenant Emmet Crawford*
Captain Henry E. Noyes,

Second Cavalry Regiment, was

also subordinate to Lieutenant Colonel Royall and was
appointed commander of the five companies of the Second
Cavalry.

The companies and commanders that formed this

b at talion w e r e : Company A, Captain Thomas B. Dewees;
Company B, First Lieutenant William B. Rawolle; Company D,
First Lieutenant Samuel M. Swigert; Company E, Captain
Elizah H. Wells; Company I, Captain Henry E. Noyes*
Major Alex Chambers of the Fourth Infantry Regiment
commanded a-battalion made up of five rifle companies from
the Fourth and Ninth Infantry Regiments.

The companies of

the Fourth Infantry were commanded by the following officers
Company D, Capt ai n Avery B. Cain; Company F, Captain
Gerhard L. Luhn.

Command of the companies of the Ninth

Regiment was as follows: Company C, Captain Samuel Munson;
Company G, Captain Thomas B, Burrowes; Company H,
Captain Andrew S. Burt.

1P

Captain A. H. Nickerson,
Regiment,

Twenty-third Infantry

and Second Lieutenant John G. Bourke,

Third

Cavalry Regiment, were assigned to serve General Crook as
aides-de-camp.
Supplies,

forage, extra ammunition, and other items

essential to the force were transported on pack mules and
y/agons.

The column was supported by a wagon train of 103

six-mule wagons,

commanded by Major John V. Furey, who also

served as the quartermaster.

A pack train of approximately

1,000 mules was siipervised by Chief Packer Tom Moore
While the force was being assembled at Fort Fet te r
man,

General Crook v/ent to the Red Cloud Agency to enlist a

contingent of scouts from peaceful Sioux bands.

Several of

the chiefs reacted favorably to the G e n e r a l ’s request and
were disposed to send some of their young men with the
troops.
vation,

When A.gent James S. Hastings returned to the reser
after an unexplained absence,

thusiasm for the venture.

.Apparently, Hastings had influ-

enced them against C r o o k ’s proposal.
12
Bourke,

13
14

Brown,

the Indians lost e n 

14

op. c i t . » pp. 289-90.
op. c i t ., p. 257.

Bourke, op. cit,, pp. 286-87.
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On May 29, 1876, C r o o k ’s forces crossed the Platte
River and h e a d e d n orth along the trail the Big Horn E x 
pedition had. followed earlier in March.

The military

portion of the Platte Column totalled forty-seven officers
and 1 , 0 0 2 enlisted men*

15

John F. Pinerty, as correspondent

of the Chicago T i m e s , who accompanied Crook, commented on
management of the column:
Colonel Royall, at the outset of our march, u s e d to
have us on the road at 5 o ’clock in the morning, but
General Crook, on assuming command, fixed the hour at
6 o ’clock for the Infantry and at 7:50 o ’clock for the
cavalry, in order that the horses might have sufficient
rest, as he intended to make night marches In pursuit
of the hostiles, accompanied by his pack train only,
after the campaign h a d been fully developed. b
The troops reached the abandoned Port Reno on June 2 .
After several days march along the old Bozeman Trail,

the

command made camp near the site of Fort Phil Kearney about
noon on June 5, 1876.

On departing Fort Phil Kearney,

the

column made a difficult march to the junction, of Prairie
Bog Creek with Tongue River.

After darkness, on June 8 ,

there was a verbal exchange between the camp pickets and an
un known person.

Arnold,

a half-breed scout was sent by

General Crook to investigate.
idioms,

Arnold replied in the Sioux

to which'the visitor did not answer.

General Crook

J oh n F. Finerty, War Pat
t-h and Bivouac, or the
Conquest of the Sioux (New ed* ; Norman.
N
University of
Oklahoma Press, 1965TT, p. 37.
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was upset because he was 'momentarily expecting the arrival
of overdue Crow scouts.

He believed the visitor was a

member of the Crow party, who was
Earlier in the day,

frightened by the reply.

IV

the Commander had received d i s 

patches notifying h i m that the Fifth Cavalry Regiment h ad
been moved from Fort Hays, Kansas,

to Fort Robinson,

and

that the male Indians capable of fighting h a d left the Red
Cloud Agency.

l ft

In answer to the popular question regarding the
whereabouts of the Sioux, a brisk rifle fire was directed
against the camp about six-thirty o ’clock on the evening of
June 9.

The Indians had made their first appearance and

were located on a high ridge overlooking the bivouac area
from the north*

Captain Mills was directed to repulse the

attack with Companies A, E, I, and M.

As Captain Mills was

completing the rout of Indians on the irndge, a party of at
tackers attempted to capture the horses by penetrating d e 
fenses on the south, side of the encampment.

After the

abortive attack, a heavy picket force secured the ridge for
the remainder of the night.

This foray was believed to have

been Crazy H o r s e ’s fulfillment of his vow to fight Crook as
soon as he touched the waters of the Tongue R i v e r . ^

17rcid,, p. 57.
vsBssama— a— -4

w

™

^'^Bou.rke, op. cit. , pp.
19

295-96.

Finerty, op. cit., pp. 59-62.

61

The command was moved to the confluence of the two
forks, of Goose Creek, where excellent water and rich
pasturage were available.

On the evening of June 14, 175

of the long-awaited Crow scouts arrived.

They were well

mounted and armed, each warrior possessing an extra pony
and a fifty caliber breech-loading rifle.

A short time

later, eighty-six Shoshones— -or Snakes wheeled into camp in
splendid style with a show of military discipline.

They

h a d been subjected to cavalry drill by their leader Tom C o s 
grove, a former captain in the Confederate Thirty-Second
Texas Cavalry,

and Chief of Scouts at the Shoshone Agency.

20

Later, General Crook assembled the officers of the column
and issued instructions regarding the march against the
Sioux.

The wagon train was to be parked and guarded by the

teamsters and 100 riflemen, under the command of Major John
V. Furey.

Officers and men were to carry four d a y !s

rations, one blanket per person,
21
nition.

and 1 0 0 rounds of ammu-

Throughout June 15, the day was given over to p r e p a 
ration for the strike.

About 175 infantrymen were to be

mounted so the column would have increased mobility.

The

pleasure of the w a l k -a-he ap s , the Indi an 1s designation of
the foot soldier, was short-lived after learning they were

20 Brown, op. cit., p. 262.
21

Bourke, o p . cit., pp. 302-03.

to be assigned mules--and each man had to break his nrule
to a saddle.

22

The command departed camp at five o '1clock on the
morning of June 16, with a force of 1,325 men,
803 cavalry,

175 mounted infantry,

comprised of

262 Indian scouts,

twenty packers and sixty-five miners, who ha d joined the
column.

The objective was a large Sioux village supposedly

located in the canyon of the Rosebud.

As the force crossed

the beautiful grasslands of the Big Horn country,
numbers of buffalo were sighted.

great

The Crows and Shoshones

broke from the column and their rifle fire reverbrated
across the plains as they inflicted a wanton slaughter
against the beasts.

General Crook had hoped to approach

the Sioux village without alarming the Indians and was
disgusted w it h the careless conduct of his allies.

23

At three o ’clock in the morning of June 17, Crook
ordered the camp awakened and at six o fclock the column
was on the march.

East of the big bend of the Rosebud and

in the vicinity of the confluence of the north and south
forks of the river, Crook halted the still-tired column for
a short rest.

It was about eight o !clock and the Crows had

been sent northward to obtain intelligence concerning the
Sioux location.
22-

^ Brown,

The command was so extended by the broken
op. c i t ., pp.

263.

2^Finerty, op. cit„, p. 78.
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ground along the line of march, that the end of the column
did not come into the rest area until about eight-thirty
o ’clock*

24
Very little concern was displayed by officers and

m en over impending events;

the mounts grazed contentedly

and General Crook and Lieutenant Bourke sat down for a game
of cards.

An aura of confidence emanated from General

Crook a nd he was not occupied with the realization that
momentarily he w o ul d be involved in the most extensive
25
Indian engagement in the history of the West*
Characteristic of the Sioux concept of battle,

the

field of confl-ict was of their choosing and admirably
suited for the slashing, feinting, and veering type of
mo un te d attack preferred by the Plains Indians.
graphically,

the battle site was dominated by a ridge on the

north side of the Rosebud.
northeast,

Topo

This ridge was oriented along a

southwest axis and was three miles in length.

Three short ridges extended at right angles to the main
ridge,

toward the southeast and.were separated by broad,

shallow valleys,

that emptied into the Rosebud.

The n o rt h

east end of the main ridge terminated in broken terrain,
that bo rd e r e d on the great bend of the river.
b u d ’s course turned to the north,
24

it flowed through a

Vro\g h n , At the Rosebud, ■p • 49.

~ 5 I o l d ., pp.

43-49.

As the Rose
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sriallow canyon that narrowed to about 150 yards in width.,
at a distance of about four miles north of the bend.
About eight-thirty o ’clock,
heard by the command,
ridge.

Immediately,

wildly.

sporadic rifle fire was

to the northwest, beyond the main
the Crow scouts came in sight,

riding

They dashed down the slopes into the alarmed

column crying,

’’Heap Sioux!

26
Heap S i ou x ! 11

The T e t o n s ’

first charges, from the northwest and the southeast were
repulsed by the Indian Allies, while the troops were being
directed into combat formations.

27

Sweeping charges and countercharges extended C r o o k 1s
forces along the main ridge of the battlefie3_d.
engagement,

During the

the fighting expanded from the broken tei>rain

at the northeast end of the ridge tov/ard the southwest and
around each of the three smaller ridges in turn.

The

Sioux, under the leadership of Crazy Horse, delivered wellconceived thrusts against weakened points in the soldier’s
defenses.

A prominent Indian leader, assumed to be Crazy

Horse, was observed directing the movements of the Sioux
bands with a-flashing mirror.
salient to another,

28

they alternately Increased and d e 

creased pressure on the soldiers,
26
27
28

Finerty,
Vaughn,

Always swirling from one

thus attempting to draw

op. c i t ., p. 84.
At the Rosebud, p. 50.

Finerty, on. cit., p. 86.

the command into isolated formations and defeat them in
detail#
C r o o k ’s dispositions,
field, -were: Noyes*

on the fully invested b a t tl e

battalion of cavalry and some infantry

held the br ok en ground at the northeast end of the ridgej
Mills*

and Van Vliet*s battalions,

supported by infantry,

held the h ig h position on the ridge,

at the junction of the

main ridge and the first of the smaller ridges oriented to
the southeast#

This position,

was the G e n e r a l ’s command post#
the southwest,
talion#

later called Crook*s Hill,
Farther down the ridge,

to

Royall directed the fight of H e n r y ’s b a t 

This force occupied a position along the middle

ridge of the three short ridges extending southeast from the
main ridge#

H e n r y ’s position was isolated from the Com-

mander's view and was about a mile from the command post#

OQ

General Crook was determined to occupy the Indian
village presumed to be at the north end of the Rosebud
Canyon.

To affect reassembly of the column, he dispatched

Captain Nickerson,

one of his aides-de-camp,

to Royall with

instructions to return H e n r y ’s battalion to C r o o k ’s Hill,
or the central position.

Nickerson had notified Royall of

the G e n e r a l ’s withdrawal order three times previously, but
the Commander of Cavalry had been unable to comply because
of the extreme pressure exerted on their position.

2G

Vaughn, At the Rosebud, p. 56#

Captain

Henry H a d been incapacitated by a near-fatal wound.

A

bullet b a d traversed bis face, below tbe eyes— entering one
cheekbone, passing through his nose, and exiting the oppo
site cheekbone.

The Sioux,

on observing a leader of the

soldiers fall f r o m his horse, had pressed their attack with
increased ferocity.

In their retreat with their wounded,

H e n r y ’s force was almost overwhelmed, but was saved by the
30
long range rifle fire of the infantry.
Prior to R o y a l l ’s return,

the General dispatched

M i l l s ’ and N o y e s ’ companies down the canyon with the a s 
surance that he would soon support them with the remainder
of the force.

The Indians observed the withdrawal of the

large number of troops from the center and soon concentrated
their attacks against C r o o k ’s Hill.
separated from Royall,

The General,

still

concluded he could not hold long

against the intensified attacks of the Indians and dispatched
Nickerson to Intercept Mills and Noyes with orders for them
to return to the battle.

The two battalions defiled from

the canyon to the west and made a wide circuit to come In
behind Crazy H o r s e ’s forces north of C r o o k ’s Hill.

The

Sioux w e r e forming for a new attack and v/ere disconcerted to
find themselves outmanuevered.

They abruptly broke off the

engagement and retreated to the northwest.
50 r b i d .. p. 6 0 .

Mills pursued

them for several miles,

then returned to C r o o k 1s position*

Still imbued with his original plan,

31

the General

assembled his command and started north through Rosebud
Canyon.

h h e n he reached the point where the terrain

narrowed, the Indian Allies refused to go farther,
it was a d e a t h trap.

The Sioux,

saying

they said, would destroy

the command when it reached the point where it had no room
to deploy*

32

Frank Grouard complained that the supply of

ammunition was dangerously low.

A quick inventory was

taken and ’I. • ♦ It d i d n ’t average ten cartridges to the
33
man, and that was the only thing that stopped h i m . ri

It

was subsequently found that the force had expended 25,000
r o un ds •
The battle was over at two-thirty o ’clock In the
afternoon, ha ving lasted for six hours, when the Sioux
suddenly retired.
rear,

At the time of M i l l s ’ appearance in their

the hostiles had rendered an excellent account of

themselves,

and the resulting question concerns the S i o u x ’s

reason for stopping the fight.

Since they had ridden all

night to reach the battlefield and had fought all day,
there was undoubtedly truth in the statement made by a
31

Finerty,

op.

c i t ., pp. 89-92.

Vaughn, At the Rosebud, p. 65.
33

,Joe LeBarthe, Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard,
ed. E d ga r I* Stewart (New ed, ; Norman:
University^!
Oklahoma, 1958), p. 121.
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subsequent Indian observer:

11They

were tired and hungry,

so

they went h o m e . r!^
Crazy Horse told officers at Red Cloud Agency in
1877 that he h a d 1,500 warriors actively' engaged on the Rose
bud battlefield and another 5,000 in reserve.

Knowing the

proclivity of the Indians to fight as individuals,

it is

difficult to conceive .the system of discipline that would
have rendered 5,000 warriors inactive, while a certain
victory promised rich loot#

35

There is little doubt that

Crook would have been overwhelmed by the addition of a
large reserve to Crazy H o r s e 1s force.
General Crook reported ten killed and twenty-one
wounded.

Frank Grouard stated that twenty-eight were kil3_ed

and fifty-six wounded.

It is impossible to verify either

Crook*s or G ro u a r d Ts statements.

Reports from Captain

Peter D. Vroom and Lieutenants Bainbridge Reynolds and Emmet
Crawford,

company commanders of the Third Cavalry,

contained in the National Archives.

are not

The units commanded by

these officers are said to have sustained the largest losses
in the battle.
34

Vaughn, who has completed extensive research

Vaughn,

At the R o s e bu d, p. 147.

^ O l i v e r Knight, Following the Indian liars.
A Story
of the Newspaper Correspondents Among the Indian C a m 
paigners (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1960),
p. 185.
36^
LeBarthe, op. c i t ., p. 122.

on this action,

opines that Crook understated the magnitu.de

of his casualties and that G r o ua rd 1s figures are closer to .
the truth.
Neither the Indians or the cavalry could claim overall victory in the fight on the Rosehud.

Both sides h ad r e 

tired in strength and required only rest and resupply to
achieve potency in "battle.

Undoubtedly,

the Indians con

sidered themselves victorious because they ha d successfully
defended their village.

Crook claimed victory for the

Platte Column in his annual report to General Sheridan dated
September 25, 1876:
At the fight on the Rosebud, June 17, the number of
our troops was less than one thousand, and within eight
days after that the same Indians we there fought met
and defeated a column of troops of nearly the same size
as ours, killing and wounding over three hundred, in
cluding the gallant commander, General Custer himself.
I invite attention to the fact that in this engage
ment my troops beat these Indians on a field of their
' own choosing, and drove them in utter rout from it, as
far as the proper care of my wounded and prudence would
justify.
Subsequent events proved beyond dispute what
would have been the fate of the command had the pursuit
been continued beyond what judgment dictated.^
Several tactical errors were committed, which could
have resulted in disaster.

At the .outset of battle,

the

General allowed the force to become too widely dispersed
with the result that Royall and Henry barely escaped
Vaughn,

•20

At the R o s eb u d. p. 6 6 .

U.S., C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , Report of the Secretary of
W a r , 44th Cong., 2 d Sess., 1876, House Ex.. boc. 1, Part 2 ,
p. 498.

annihilation.

Later, when he dispatched Mills and Noyes

down the canyon, he divided his force dangerously and faced
the possibility of being overwhelmed on the battlefield*
He recouped this error by ordering the two battalions to
return to the ridge from the northwest,

or behind the battle

line of the Sioux.
General Crook .was greatly disappointed in the out
come of the fight and habored bitterness toward Colonel
Hoyall*

This sentiment was demonstrated in 1886, during a

discussion between the two men at C r o o k ’s home in Omaha.
The scene was witnessed by Major Guy V. Henry,

one Captain

Roberts and Second Lieutenant W. V. Kennon, who recorded
the scene and conversation in his diary.

39

It should be noted that none of the contemporary
newspaper accounts attached the stigma of defeat to the
A r m y ’s performance on the Rosebud in 1 8 7 6 . ^

Indeed,

it is

difficult to understand ho w the Platte Column could have
achieved more against the well-led and resolute enemy.
39^

Jiarlier in 1886, during a newspaper interview,
Colonel Royall had criticized Crook for faulty generalship
at the Rosebud.
Luring the Omaha meeting, General Crook
accused Royall of making disparaging and unfair statements
to the public*
Crook further blamed Royall and Nickerson
for delayed response to his orders to regroup during the
battle.
Hoyall countered by saying that Crook was not
specifically named in the newspaper article, and that he
h a d responded to C r o o k ’s orders v/hen Nickerson delivered
them.
Vaughn, At the R o s e b u d , pp. 165-66.

^Knight,

op. clt. . p. 141.

CHAPTER IV
JOINING WITH TERRY
Crook directed the return of his force to the site
of the m o r n i n g ’s bivouac,

after deciding to abandon the

quest for the Indian village north of the battlefield.
Proper care of the wounded and decent burial of the dead
were matters that required immediate attention.

Military

dead were covertly interred on the banks of the Rosebud,

to

prevent the Sioux from exhuming the bodies and removing the
sc-alps.'*'
After the Shoshones completed the burial ceremony of
a youthful horse guard, early on the morning of June 18,
the troops broke camp on the Rosebud,

The column reached

the wagon train encampment on Goose Creek the following day.
General Crook ordered the wagon train to return to Fort
Fetterman,

on June 21, for additional supplies and to evacu

ate the wounded to that post for more adequate treatment.
He requested reinforcements and attempted no action other
than to reconnoiter the area east of the Big Horn Mountains
o
and north of his encampment for Sioux forces.
1

Bourke,

op. c i t . , pp. 316-17.

2
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex, D o c ♦"T “ Part 2,
pp. 442-43.
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General Crook was Informed that Colonel Wesley
Merritt would reinforce the Platte Column with the Fifth
Cavalry Regiment.

Merritt,

an excellent officer who

possessed an outstanding Civil War record, was detached
from General Sheri da n1s staff to assume regimental command
from Lieutenant Colonel Eugene A. Carr.

Colonel Merritt

was to he delayed in joining Crook until August 3, 1876.
While waiting for reinforcements,

-

from June 21

through August 3, Crook constantly moved his camp to provide
adequate pasturage for his animals.
to serve as his aide-de-camp,

Bourke, who continued

remarked that another reason

for the many moves was to keep the troops occupied.

To

dispell the boredom of dull camp routine, personnel went
hunting in the Big Horn Mountains for elk, deer,
mountain sheep,

and

or made phenomenal catches of the succulent

trout from clear fresh water streams.
Crook v/as impatient to receive news from Terry and
Gibbon, but fully appreciated the difficulty of communi
cating over the short distance that separated his force
from the troops on the Yellowstone.

The scouts constantly

reported signs of Sioux parties beyond the perimeter of his
camp and he was assured the country between the two commands
was alive with hostiles.

To ascertain the location and

strength of the enemy, a party of twenty-five soldiers and

5Xbid., p. 507.
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two scouts commanded by Lieutenant Frederick W. Sibley of
Troop E, Second Cavalry Regiment, departed camp on June 6 /
to make a reconnaissance toward the Little Big Horn River.
John F. Finerty,

4

the correspondent who accompanied this

venture, wrote a vivid account of the g r o u p 1s harrowing e x 
periences.

Only by leaving their horses as decoys for a

party of Sioux and Cheyennes, who were besieging them, were
S i b l e y 1s men able to slip away into the fastness of the Big
Horn Mountains.

With little rest and no food, the party

returned fifty miles to camp,

on foot, arriving on July 9.

General Crook was certain that disaster had over
taken T e r r y 1 s command.

His fears Y/ere confirmed on July 1 0 ,

when messengers brought dispatches from Fort Fetterman,
telling of the catastrophe that had befallen the capricious
5
Custer.
This information had been relayed from Sheridan*s
headquarters in Chicago to the Platte Column, making the
line of communication 'between Crook and Terry over 2,000
miles in length.
The group of dispatches received by Crook on July 1 0 ,
contained a communication from Sheridan enjoining the C o m 
mander of the Platte Column to "Hit them again and hit them
harderIn

After considering his commander*s injunction,

Crook remarked,
4

T'I wish Sheridan would come out here himself

Finerty,

op. c i t . , p. 113.

5

Bourke, op. cit., p. 334.

and show us how to do it*.

It is rather difficult to

surround three Indians with one soldier.!l®
The Platte Column received the first direct communi
cation from Terry on July 12, when three courageous
soldiers of the Seventh Infantry rode into C r o o k 1s camp*
These heroes were Privates James Bell, William Evans, and
Benjamin F. Stewart*

On July 19, four Crow scouts arrived

with copies of the same dispatches previously delivered hy
Bell, Evans,

and Stewart®

Terry h a d directed duplicate

copies of his messages to be sent by a second group of
couriers, because of the great risk involved in traversing
the intervening country*
The wagon train returned with supplies f rom Fort
Fetterman on July 13, accompanied by seven companies of the
Q
Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Infantry Regiments*
With it
came the unwelcomed news of M e r r i t t 1s delay,

engendered by

the threatened break-out of the Cheyenne warriors at Red
Cloud and Spotted Tail Agencies*

Sheridan directed the im

patient Crook to withhold his force from the field, until
Merritt could join him*

Sheridan further advised that after

Merritt had joined Crook, the reinforced Platte Column
Finerty,

op. cit . t p* 129*

7
U . S . , Congress, douse, Report of the Secretary of
W a r , 44th Cong., 2 d Sess., 1876, House E x e Roc* 1, Part 2,
p. 465*
0
Finerty, op* cit., p. 143®

should seek and join Terry "before attempting action against
the hostile s.

9

The old Shoshone Chief, Washakie,

concurred,

saying to Crook:
The Sioux and Cheyennes have three to your one, even
now that you have "been reinforced; why not let them
alone for a few days?
They cannot subsist the great
numbers of warriors and men in their camp, and will
have to scatter for pasturage and meat; t h e y 111 begin
to fight among themselves about the plunder taken on
the battle-field, and many will want to slip into the
agencies and rejoin their families#1
Scouting parties sent out by Crook failed to discover
the location of the Sioux.

One party consisted of half-

breeds who investigated the Big Horn River;

the other party

made up entirely of Shoshones went to the headwaters of the
Little Big Horn#

They found large camp sites and a trail

leading northeast in the direction of Powder River#
Prior to joining Crook, Merritt was to be engaged in
a rear area policing action.

The Fifth Cavalry patrolled a

broad avenue, running northwest of the Red Cloud and Spotted
Tail Agencies,

over which the warring bands on the Little

Big Horn 7/ere reinforced.

.Approximately 1,000 Cheyenne

warriors remained on those reservations and after news of
the fights on the Rosebud and Little Big Horn, were i m 
patient to join their allies.11
^Bourke,
10
11
Norman;

Colonel Merritt was informed

op. cit., p* 341.

Ibid., pp.

341-42.

Charles King, C a m p aigning with Crook (New ed, ;
University of 0k3.ahonia Press, 1964), pp. 23-24.

on July 15, that 800 Cheyenne warriors would bolt the
reservation on the following day, fully equipped for the
lo
warpath and determined to join the Sioux, ~ After a
vigorous forced march,

the Fifth Cavalry was placed in

position to intercept the Cheyennes on War Bonnet Creek#
In the short engagement w i th the advanced element of the
Indians,

on the morning of July 16, Buffalo Bill Cody, who

accompanied the troops as a scout, killed the young chief
Yellow Hand#

The surprised Cheyennes were stampeded back

to the reservation,

leaving a trail of saddle bags stuffed

w i t h Government provender#
Merritt departed Red Cloud Agency on July 18, and
proceeded to Fort Fetterman#
Fifth Cavalry marched north,
on August 3*

From Fort Fetterman,

on July 26, and joined Crook

The Regiment comprised of ten companies that

were divided into two battalions,
companies#

the

The First Battalion,

each containing five
comprised of Companies A,

C, G, I, and M, was commanded by Major John J. Upharn,
Second Battalion,

The

that contained Companies B, D, E, F, and

K, was commanded, by Major Julius K# Mason#
Counting the new arrivals,
mastered 2,100 men#'

14

the Platte Column

The Command included twenty-five

^S I bid., pp. 24-25©

companies of cavalry from the Second, Third,
Regiments;
Ninth,

and Fifth

ten companies of infantry from the Fourth,

and Fourteenth Regiments;

225 Shoshone

scouts,

tv/enty-five TJte scouts, and thirty white and half-breed
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

scouts and civilians.

15

Spartan preparations,

typical of C r o o k ’s combat

marches, were directed for his move to join Terry.

Each

man was permitted to take one poncho,

one blanket,

coat, and only the clothing he wore.

Rations for twelve to

fifteen days were provided.

an over

A mule train of 399 animals

w ould accompany the march with needed supplies.

10

Part of

their cargo would consist of 150,000 rounds of ammunition,
3V
in addition to the 100 rounds each man carried. *

All

superfluous baggage was stored in the wagons, which were to
return to Forts Fetterman and Laramie after the column d e 
parted.

Major Furey,

still serving as quartermaster,

super

vised a force of 200 wagoneers who manned the train of 160
v eh ic le s«
The horses were in poor condition,

and under more

favorable circumstances, would not have been subjected to
field service.
two months,
15
16

17

C r o o k ’s mounts had been without grain for

subsisting only on grass.

Knight,

op.

c i t ., p. 253.

Bourke,

op. c i t . , p. 348.

Knight,

op.

cit., p. 253.

Horses of the Fifth
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Cavalry h ad Toeen weakened in thwarting the Cheyenne on War
Bonnet Creek and ha d subsequently made the long march to
18
join the Platte Column.
Many of the poor animals were to
die of exhaustion before any of their number would again
feed on oats in a civilized stable; many of the cavalrymen
v/ould become' foot soldiers and dine on horse meat before
their mission was completed.
There was a feeling of anticipation and relief
from boredom w he n the long-awaited move to join Terry began
on August 5.
enemy,

In an attempt to uncover some sign of the

the line of march proceeded northward along the

winding Tongue River.

After failing to discover the Sioux,

trail, Crook m oved westward to the Rosebud.
The command intercepted the Rosebud about six
miles north of the bloody ground that had witnessed the
desperate struggle between Crook and Crazy Horse,
June 17.

Riding north,

earlier on

the column passed the point

and Noyes had defiled from the canyon.

Mills

About a mile and a

half farther down the Rosebud, a barrier of felled trees and
brush obstructed the floor and sides of the canyon.

If the

eight companies of the Second and Third Regiment h a d con
tinued another half mile down the river,

they would have

been annihilated in the cul-de-sac cleverly prepared by the

18

Finerty, op. cit., p. 155.
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Sioux. '

The site of t h e •Indian village* Crook*s objective

during the Battle of the Rosebud, was discovered on
August 8* in proximity to its reported location.

Camp d e 

bris indicated the village had extended four miles down the
river valley and was surrounded by rock-guarded eminences.
Scouts reported Indian trails in the vicinity were ten to
twelve days old,

and were made by a herd of 10,000 to

20,000 p o n i e s . ^
M u c h of the country traversed during August 7 and 8,
was covered w i t h smoke from grass fires that had been
started by the Indians.

21

formally, burning was considered

to promote luxuriant spring growth during the following
season.

In this case,

the soldiers were certain denudation

of the prairies was intended to deprive their mounts of
pasturage.
The column proceeded northward along the Rosebud,
intercept an Indian trail,
recent origin.

to

reported by the scouts to be of

On August 10, within thirty miles of the

Yellowstone River,

a huge cloud of dust was observed rising

from the concealed Rosebud valley, north of their position.
Scouts and commanders,

on riding forward to determine if

Indians or buffalo were to be encountered, finally saw
■*^F l n e r b y , op.
20Brown,

op.

c i t •, p . 157.
»

c i t ., p. 283.
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large groups of horsemen in the distance.

In response to

sighting advanced elements of C r o o k ’s troops,
horsemen fanned out to form skirmishers,
manner of cavalrymen.
converged while

the strange

in the practiced

The forces, of Crook and Terry h a d

searching for the large body of Sioux,

force thinking the other was the object of the chase©

each

22

Details regarding the loss of Custer and his f a v o r 
ite troops of the Seventh Cavalry--Companies C, E, F,

I,

and L — was available to the personnel of C r o o k ’s command
for the first time.

Intimate accounts of the action were

gleaned from surviving members of the battalions that had
been under the command of Major Marcus A. Reno and Captain
Frederick W. Benteen.
estimated strength

Official reports of 1876 stated the

of the Sioux and their Cheyenne Allies

to be approximately 2,500 warriors.

Military witnesses,

called to testify before the Reno Court of Inquiry,

convened

in Chicago on January 15, 1879, presented statements r e 
garding the Indians’ strength on the fateful day of June 25,
1876.

These estimates range from 5,000 to 5,000 warriors.

The village,

In moving, west about four o ’clock in the aft er 

noon of June 26, formed a compact body of warriors,
ponies, and horse-drawn travois.

families,

That savage formation h a d

'King, op. c i t . , pp. 71-72.
25

U.S., Congress, House, Reoort of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2,
p. 478.
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been estimated to be a half mile to a mile wide and two
and a half to three miles long.

24

G i b b o n s Montana Column,

after advancing to unite

with C u s t e r ’s Seventh Cavalry on June 26, found only the
dead bodies of Custer and his five companies scattered
along the east bank of the Little Big Horn on June 27.
After burying the dead^, Gibbon* s force with the survivors
of the Regiment retired to the mouth of the Big Horn, where
he remained until July 27.

On that date, he moved down the

Yellowstone to a new depot at the mouth of the Rosebud,
preparatory to uniting wi th Crook.

25

Terry ha d been reinforced by six companies of the
Twenty-second Infantry Regiment,
Colonel E. S. Otis,

commanded by Lieutenant

that reached h i m on August 1.

Colonel

N. A. Miles arrived the next day with six companies of the
Fifth Infantry Regiment.

The infantry had been reorganized

into four battalions under the command of Colonel Gibbon.
The eight remaining companies of the Seventh Cavalry were
commanded by Major Reno,
organization.

senior surviving officer of that

Four companies of the Second Cavalry Regiment

were commanded by Major J. S. Brisbin.

T e r r y ’s combined

OA

»7. A. Graham, Abstract of the Official Record of
Proceedings of the Reno Court of Inquiry (Ha rr i s b u r g : The
Stackpole Co., 1954), pp. 76, 99, 109, 165.
U.S., .C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2,
pp. 475-74.
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force contained two, ten-pound rifles and one,

twelve-

p ou nder under Lieutenant W. K. Low of the Twentieth.
Infantry Regiment.

26

The depot on the Rosebud h a d been fortified with
entrenchments as a precaution against attack after departure
of the command*

Defense of that point was entrusted to

Captain L. H* Sanger, _who was supported by one company of
the Seventeenth Infantry,
Cavalry,

the dismounted men of the Seventh

and three Gatling guns.

27

To increase the mobility of his force, Terry r e 
turned his wagons to the depot and loaded the required
supplies on pack mules.

28

The pack trains of the Montana

and Dakota Columns were in shabby contrast to the practiced
and efficient operations of the Platte Column.

Bourke,

an

e xperienced critic of mule trains observed:
On the first d a y Ts march, after meeting Crook,
T e r r y ’s pack-train dropped, lost, or damaged, more
stores than C r o o k ’s command h ad spoiled from the same
causes f ro m the time when the campaign commenced.
Gibbon was quick to discern the importance of
p ro pe rl y conducted pack trains and decried the amateur
efforts of his personnel in his official reports of
October 17, 1876.
2 6 I b l d . , pp. 465-56.
27
I b i d . , p. 466.
2 8 Ibid.

29

Bourke, op. cit., p. 355.
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Incumbered with heavily-loaded wagon-trains, our
movements were necessarily slow, and when we did cut
loose from these our only means of transporting sup
plies were the mules taken f ro m the teams, and u n 
broken to packs, unsuitable pack-saddles, and inex
perienced soldiers as packers.
These latter soon
learned to do their part tolerably well, but at the
expense of the poor animals, whose festering sores
after a few d a y s 1 marching appealed not only to
feelings of humanity, but demonstrated the false
economy of the course pursued.
. . . The contrast between the mobility of our
force and that of General C r o o k 1s was very marked,
especially for rapid movements.
General C r o o k 1s wellorganized pack-train, with trained mules and its corps
of competent packers, moved almost independently of
the column of troops, and as fast as they could move.
His ranks were not depleted by drafts to take charge
of the packs and animals, for each mule faithfully
followed the sound of the l e a d e r ’s bell and needed no
other guide, and his pack-mules were neither worn ouj^n
nor torn to pieces by bad saddles and worse packing.*'
After Terry had stripped his command for action,
the combined forces of about 4,000 m en began a march eastward
following the Indians’ trail, on August 11, and camped for
the evening on the Tongue River.

31

That night a heavy down

pour pelted the shelterless command and the rain continued
until the afternoon of the next day.

The march turned

northward at the Tongue River and through August 12 and 13,
horses began dropping along the way.
the Yellowstone River,

Within forty miles of

the direction of march was changed

eastward to the Powder River.
Marching through the mud exhausted some of the newly-

50U •S ., Congress, H o u s e , Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Roc. 1, Part 2,
p. 475.

31

Finerty, on. cit., p. 165.

recruited infantrymen of T e r r y 1s command; by August 15,
additional recruits were

suffering from swollen and bloody

feet. These young men were placed on travois,

extra mules,

or, in several cases, the Shoshones loaded them on their
52
ponies.
The expedition reached the Yellov^stone on
August 17, and camped at the mouth of the Powder P.iver.
Slow movement .of the expedition became a source of
discontent to the Ute and Shoshone

scouts.

The friendly.

Indians would not serve with T e r r y fs column because of its
disreputable pack train.

They said it impeded progress and

the enemy would never be caught.

The Utes and Shoshones

returned to their homes on August 20.

Reports received at

that time informed the Commanders that the Crows w o u l d not
send warriors so far from their own country with hostile
Sioux on the warpath.
the half-breeds,

35

C r o o k ’s only remaining acouts were

the white frontiersmen,

and a small party

of Ree warriors.
Steamboats,

that had supported Terry since the

beginning of the expedition,

resupplied the forces at the

Powder River from the depot on the Rosebud.
fifteen d a y s 1 rations,
Powder on August 24.

After drawing

C r o o k ’s force moved southward up the
Terry followed the next day, but

returned to the Yellowstone after receiving reports of
^Ibid.,

^Bourke,

p. 167.

or), cit. . p. 355-57.
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hostile Indians along the river.

Before departing,

Terry

assured Crook that additional supplies would he transported
to the mouth of Glendive Creek, eastward on the Yellowstone

•
rj••
34
River.
Crook h ad resolved to follow the Sioux trail until
he attained his objectives:

defeat and capture the hostiles,

or run them onto the reservations.

The line of General

C r o o k 1s inarch departed the Powder River on August 25, and
assumed pursuit of the Sioux along the trail originally
followed with Terry.

The days and nights of August 25

through September 4, were punctuated with occasional rain,
and one night of extreme cold.
main enemy, but malnutrition,

Mud continued to be the
exposure,

sulted in neuralgia,

and overwork r e 

rheumatism, malaria,
35
among .the debilitated personnel.
The Little Missouri River,

and diarrhea

a sullen,

turbid stream

flowing northward from the Blackhills, was crossed on
September 4.

Continuing eastv/ard, a tributary of the Heart

River was intercepted on September 5, at a point 160 miles
west of Fort Abraham Lincoln and 200 miles north of the
Black Hills.

The column had a small encounter with a body

34

U.S., Go ng r e s s , H o u s e , Report of the Secretary of
V/ar, 44 th Cong., 2d Ses-s., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2,
pp. 466-67.
35

Bourke, o p . cit., p. 363.
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of hostiles,

thought to he the e n e m y ’s rear guard.

36

With only two and a half d a y s ’ rations remaining
General Crook was forced to choose hetween three alterna
tives:

first, undergo a four or five day march eastward to

Fort Abraham Lincoln, where his exhausted troops v/ould find
ease and comfort;

second,

countermarch over his previous

trail and direct his column to the supply depot Terry had
e stablished for h i m on the Yellowstone--at the mouth of
Glendive Creek;
Black Hills,
River.

or third, proceed directly southward to the

that were seven d a y s ’ march from the Heart

Since the scouts reported a fresh trail leading

toward the unprotected mining communities, Crock considered
himself duty-bound to pursue the elusive Sioux and prevent
their depredating against the illegal residents of the
Hills.

37

At this time, he was convinced the summer con

federation of the Sioux had dispersed;
to Canada,

others to the Black Hills,

h a d returned to the reservations.

some hands had gone
and the less defiant

38

In dispatches rushed to Fort Abraham Lincoln,

Crook

reported his plans to Sheridan in Chicago and requested
supplies meet the column,
Hills.

in the northern edge of the Black

Discussing his plan with Finerty,
56...
I b i d ., p. 365.
* ^7 Ibid.
38

Knight, op. cit., p. 268.

General Crook

88

anticipated shortages in rations,

saying,

"X have sent a telegram for supplies to General
Sheridan*
The wagons will meet us at Crook City or
Deadwood*
If not, the settlements must supply our
wants*
Nobody knows much about this region, but it
looks fair.
We *11 kill some game, too, perhaps, to
make up for short rations.
Half rations will be
issued after to-night.
All will be glad of the
movement after the march has been r^ade.
If necess ar y, ”
he added, "we can eat our h o r s e s . 1'0
The march to the Black Hills began on September 5,
over country barren of firewood and palatable water.
column was pelted continually by cold rain.

The

Horses were

abandoned by the score and some abruptly collapsed on the
trail,* as if shot.

On September 7, the Commander directed

Captain Anson Mills to lead 150 men f rom the Third Cavalry
Regiment to Deadwood to procure supplies for the starving
column.

Accompanying Captain Mills*

mules and packers under Tom Moore.

party, were fifty pack
Other officers a s 

sisting Mills were First Lieutenants Emmet Crav.eford,
40
A. H. Von Leuttewitz, and Frederick Schwatka.
Horse meat
became a common source of su stenance.on September 8, as the
41
overstretched rations were, exhausted.
As the column was breaking camp on September 9, a
messenger from-Captain Mills informed General Crook that
Finerty,

op.

ci t. » p. 185.

^^Ibid., pp. 184-85.
41
Ibid., p. 185.

the detachment had attacked and captured a Sioux village of
forty-one lodges at Slim Buttes.

Mills advised the General

that the Sioux were attempting to regain their village and
each of his horsemen had been equipped with only fifty
rounds of ammunition.

The fight was seventeen miles south

of the column,

and Crook immediately dispatched 100 men to
42
reinforce Mills.
Captain Mills h ad attacked the village at dawn,
stampeding the pony herd between the teepees.
Sioux prisoners were taken,

Only a few

the majority having reached a

bluff from where they fired effectively on the troops,
the early morning light.
the Commander,

Additional troops,

in

accompanied by

reached the village at eleven-thirty o !clock

and the balance of the column arrived in the late afternoon, after the fight was finished,*
From captives,

43

the soldiers learned the chief of the

village was American Horse, who had been fatally wounded.
The teepees yielded a large amount of military property
identified as previously belonging to the Seventh Cavalry
AA

R e g im en t. "

Ureat quantities of dried food,

including meat,

was immediately appropriated by the soldiers, who were

90

anxious to feast on something more appetizing than horse
flesh,
Indian captives laughed when they saw the soldiers
devouring the dried meat,
7;hen he asked them why they
laughed, Grouard was in turn asked v/h&t kind of meat
they thought they were eating.
Grouard said they
supposed it was 'buffalo and venison,
No, an Indian
replied, the pony soldiers had kept them too m uch on
the run that summer for them to hunt.
Well, then,
asked Grouard, what kind of meat was it?
That, said
a delighted savage, was the ponies that died.
Crazy Horse, encamped in the near vicinity,

answered

the summons of his kinsmen and resumed the attack about
five o ’clock in the afternoon.

Instead of finding only

M i l l s ’ detachment of 150 troopers,

the great Sioux war

chief was opposed by the complete Platte Column.

The long

range fire of the infantry forced the Sioux to retire.
Crook lost three dead and about twenty-seven wounded.
Among the wounded was the valiant Von Leuttevvitz, whose leg
had been severely shattered at the outset, and had later
id
been ampu ta te d •
The column camped at American H o r s e ’s village on the
evening ox" September 9.

Some of the soldiers obtained their

first decent rest in six weeks, by draping their couches
with, buffalo robes.

Before putting his force on the trail

the next morning, Crook released the Indian, prisoners.
45

K n ig ht , o p . ext., pp.

He

274-75.

46 ’
U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
War, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876,’House Bx. l5ocTTr7~Part~27
p. 509,

told them the Government.had no desire to kill the Indians,
but they must accept unconditional surrender or be continually harassed*

47

These words were undoubtedly carried

to the tribes and Crook*s kindness to the women and children
must have scored strongly with the primitives,
subsequent councils*

in their

As the troops filed southward from

the camp on September 10, Crazy Horse attacked the rear
guard axid wounded several soldiers, but lost five of his
braves*
The marches of September 10, 11, and. 12, were m i s e r 
able experiences;

the rain and mud continued to be the bane

of their existence and by September 12, some of the
personnel had returned to the diet of fresh horse meat*
Also, on that date,

seventy of the horses collapsed*

48

While breakfasting on horse steak the morning of Sep
tember 13, wagons w i th supplies, accompanied by a herd of
fifty cattle,

arrived in camp from. Crook City*

arrival of the food train,

With the

the members of the expedition

could feel they were again in touch with civilization*
General Crook relegated command of the column to
AQ
Colonel Merritt on September 15®'
In pursuance to
Sheridan*s order to report to Fort Laramie,
a7
48

Bourke,
Pinerty,

op* cit*, p. 37b.
op* c i t ., p* 202.

49Itold., p„ 206.

Crook and his

staff departed Deadwood on September 19.

After resting at

Fort Robinson until September 22, the party continued to
Laramie, arriving there on September 27.

50

The march of the Platte Column from August 5, when
the force departed its wagon train, until September 13,
when supplies arrived from Crook City, has been treated by
some Vvriters as General C r o o k 1s invention to promote human
misery.

Truly,

the hardships and privations experienced by

those men have been seldom exceeded in the military history
of the United States.

”It rained for twenty-two days, most

of the storms being of phenomenal .severity.”

51

The men. v/ere

thoroughly wet much of the time, and had no extra clothing*
When, they arrived in the small mining communities of the
Black Hills,
nel.

they bore no resemblance to military person

Between 500 and 600 horses Y^ere abandoned or killed

because of exhaustion*

6

Horse meat had comprised the

source of food for more than a week prior to the arrival of
the Crook City ration train.
The most obvious reason for General C r o o k ’s march was
that his superiors directed him to harass, pursue,
drive the hostiles into the reservations.

and

There is no

indication that Crook did not understand the reasons for
Ibid., pp. 216-19.
v “Bourke,
52

op,

c i t ., p. 380.

Finerty, op. cit., p. 205.

this policy,

or that he was not in full ■sympathy, with the

measures required to effect its enforcement.

The m a rc h

resulted from his firm resolution to fulfill the policy
directed by his Government.

He realized his force might be

strained to the limits of endurance and he never assured
his associates they would engage the Indians in a decisive
battle,

after departing from Terry.

His justification for

the mar c h was that a resolute show of force would hasten
the collapse of Sioux resistance.
53

53

U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
\Sa r , 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc* 1, Part 2,~
p . o06«

CHAPTER V
FINAL AFFAIRS OF 1876
After General C r o o k ’s arrival at Fort Laramie on
September 27, he discussed with General Sheridan three
problems of immediate importance:

first,

the establishment

of two military posts in the unceded Sioux hunting grounds,
south of the Y e l l o w s t o n e ;^ second,

continuation of the

punitive measures against the non-reservation Indians;
and third,

the dismounting and disarming of the Indians on

the Sioux reservations.

2

The Commander of the Division of the Missouri ha d
urged,

in his report of 1874,

the establishment of two

forts in the midst of the area favored by the -renegade
Sioux;

that is, the area south of the Yellowstone and b e 

tween the Powder River and the eastern slope of the Big
Horn Mountains.

In his report of 1876, he cited the

failure to build these forts as a reason for the diffi'Z.

culties encountered during the summer with the Sioux.
^Records at the War Department Record Group 94,
Document File 4164 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 5184 AGO 1876.
^Knight,
5

op.

c i t ., p. 280.

U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of
W a r , 44th C o n g . , 2d Sess., 1876, House Ex. Doc. 1, Part 2,
p. 442.

impressed by Sheridan*s reasoning and the exigencies of the
situation,

the Secretary of War had encouraged Congressional

appropriation of $200,000 for -construction of the instal
lations*

Congress, motivated by the terrible disaster that-

h a d befallen Custer, passed a bill appropriating the roquested funds, on July 22, 1876*

4

In his telegram of tne

same date, Sherman notified his Lieutenant General of the
Congressional action and u r g ed Sheridan proceed vfith hispatch in establishing the new posts*v
Sheridan*s recommendation of 1874 had envisioned
additional forts on the Yellowstone,
Tongue and Big Horn Rivers,

at the mouths of the

In his letter of August 10,

1876, .Sheridan advised the General of the Army that he
would be unable

to build the fort on the Big Horn because

of the lateness of the season and the consequent fall of
the Yellowstone River*

He suggested the second fort w ould

be located in the vicinity of old Fort Phil Kearny,
6
southern end of the unceded hunting grounds.
As of August 10, 1876,

at the

Sheridan doubted Crook and

Terry would engage the hostile Indians in a decisive stand.
He voiced the opinion that the only solution was through
flbi d ., p. 37.
^Records of the War Department, Record Group 94,
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 4212 AGO 1876.
6

Records of the Y/ar Department, Record Group 94,
Document File 4163 (Sioux War-) 1876, Item: 4718 AGO 1876.

control of the game country and firm policing of the Sioux
agencies.

Further justification for the forts was co n

tained in his views- on the Indians* modus op er a n d ! :
I have never looked on any.decisive battle with these.
Indians as a settlement of the trouble, and in fact I
have never expected any decisive battle at all®
Indians
do not fight such battles; they only fight boldly when
they have the advantage, as in the Custer case, or to
cover the movement of their women and children, as in
the case of Crook on June 17,
Battle of the Rosebud
but Indians have scarcely ever been severely punished
unless by adapting their ovm mode of warfare, or
tactics, and stealing on them®
General Sherman in his letter of August 25, 1876,
Sheridan continued to hope for a decisive engagement®
propriety of Sheridan* s plans v/ere obvious,

to

The

in the event it

became necessary to defeat the Indians in detail®
Replying to Sherman*s letter on August 30, 1876,

8
Sheridan

assured his superior the troops would pursue the hostiles
until t h e y were subdued.

In discussing the site of the

forts, he advised Sherman the installation at the mouth of
the Tongue River would be established as originally planned.
The southern fort would be located on the site of old Fort
Reno, where some of the buildings could be reconditioned
for use as barracks and storehouses.

Strategically,

this

fort provided a point for surveillance of the upper Powder
River and the Indian trail from the agencies to Powder
7
fIbid.
8,
Re cor as of the Y*ar Department Record Group 94,
Document File 4164 (Sioux War) 1876, Item: 4990 AGO 1876.

River®

It was near enough to Fort Fetterman to be supplied

at the late period of the season when General Crook could
furnish personnel and transportation.

9

The new forts were to be of prime importance in sup
porting the winter campaign of 1876-77 against the n o n 
reservation Sioux.

Colonel Kelson A. Miles,

the energetic

Commander of the Fifth Infantry, would march from the
Tongue River Cantonment to deliver damaging blows to the
bands of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse.

George Crook,

the

taciturn veteran of numerous Indian wars, would conduct his
final campaign of 1876 from Cantonment Reno.
For the third time,

in 1876,

General Crook became

engrossed in the collection of forces for a thrust against
the hostile s.

This column,

officially designated as the

Powder River Expedition, was to be assembled from military
units that had not been exhausted in previous expeditions.
The Fourth Cavalry Regiment,

from Kansas, was among the new

units assigned to the latest enterprise.
Mackenzie,

Colonel Ranald S.

Regimental Commander, was a contemporary of

Merritt and Custer,

and had been one of the victors of the

campaigns against the Southern Plains Indians, during 1874
and 1875.
9
Records of the War Department Record Group 94,
Document File 4164 (Sioux War) 1876, Item.: 5184 AGO 1876.
"^William H. Leckie, The Military Conquest of the
Southern Plains (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press,
1963), pp. 234-35.
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While planning the nev; movement, Crook was diverted
Sheridan to the Red Clond Agency on October 14, and
began disa rm in g and immobilizing the Indians*

When the

General arrived, he received reports that the Agency
Indians w e r e In communication with the hostiles.

11

The

Oglala bands of Red Cloud and Red Leaf had moved their
camps to C ha dron Creek,

twenty-two miles from the agency.

The 'military wanted all the bands close to the agency to
prevent the incoming stragglers from being confused with
the peaceful Indians,

The Red Cloud and Red Leaf bands were

suspected of selling arms and ammunition to their hostile
brethren.®

They incited further distrust of the Army by
*ip
refusing orders to move to the agency#

Colonel Wesley Merritt had been ordered south from
")Kr
the Black HI13..S to surround the reservation Indians.J',j
Crook h a d obtained information that some of the Indians at
the outlying villages were preparing to flee to the war
camps.

He confounded their scheme by going into action

before Merritths arrival.

Colonel Mackenzie, w ith eight

companies of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment and some Pawnee
Scouts d eparted Fort Robinson, near Red Cloud Agency,

after

" "'Records of the War Department, Record Group 94,
Document File 4163 (Sioux War) 1976, Item: 6429 AGO 1876,
1 0 Bourke,

^Klng,

op. c i t ., p. 337.

op, cit, , p# 140.
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dark on the evening of October 22.14
surrounded the next morning,

Finding themselves

the truant bands peacefully

surrendered, were immediately d-isarmed and deprived of their
ponies,

and returned to the Agency.

fifty rifles were seized.

About 700 horses and

15

General Crook assembled the chiefs of the Oglalas,
Brules, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes to inform them the Govern
m ent expected their loyalty in return for the rations and
support they accepted from the Agencies.

He notified the

chiefs that they were to be h e l d responsible for the conduct
of their young men and since he had been charged with maintainlng peace,

they would regret future depredations.

16

Red

Cloud was informed he was no longer a chief and the friendly
Spotted Tail was appointed h ea d chief.
October 50, to General Sheridan, he

17

In his letter of

justified his action In

not disarming the bands that had demonstrated good faith:
The other bands, not disarmed, known as the Arapahoes, Loafers, and Cut-off Sioux have been loyal to us,
and, to have disarmed them v/ith the others would simply
have arrayed the white man against the Indian and placed
the loyal and disloyal on the same footing.
By not
doing this they were convinced in the most decided
manner, that such was not our intention, and no amount
of talk about "our fr ie ndship,ff and ffthe friendship of
1 4-

Records of the War Department, Record Group 94,
Document File 4153 (Sioux War) 1876, Item* 6429 AGO 1876.
15
Brown, op. c i t ., p. 294.
16
B o ur ke , o p . c 11 ., pp.. 387-88.

17

Brown, o p . cit.
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the Great' F a t h e r , 15 would have so thoroughly impressed
it upon their minds®
For the first- time in the history of this reser
vation did they see the loyal treated as well even as
those v/ho have been persistently stubborn and disloyal®
This good effect was at once manifested in the desire
of warriors from these bands to
”
"
"
'ments
have since been going on there
Crook* s letter v:as forwarded to the General of the
Army and the Secretary of War®

Sheridan*s endorsement of

November 6, to his subordinate1s communication,
a divergent point of view,

illustrated

in the technique of handling

surrendered Indians:
The action of Gen® Crook in disarming the Redcloud
and Redleaf bands of Indians at the Redcloud Agency is
highly approved.
His neglect to disarm and dismount
other bands at that Agency is disapproved, and all the
theories in his report seem to be given as a plea for
not having performed what he promised and what was
expected of him, ang which would have been good policy
and true humanity. ^
Regardless of General Sheridan*s opinions,

the

friendly Indians were not immediately disarmed and immobilised.

In his letter of November 16, 1876, Major J. W.

Mason, Commander of Fort Robinson,

Informed General Sheridan

that the friendly bands were still armed.

General Crook had

successfully recruited scouts from among these Indians for
his PoY,:der River Fxpeditlon®

Document File 4163

Major Mason, possibly fearing

(Sioux War) 1876,

teco r d Gr ou p 94
Item: 6429 AGO 1876.
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General Sheridan,

’’The families of Indians who are with

Genera?!. Crook are protected and cared for,

so that no

dissatisfaction may result from ill treatment of them.”

20

The summer campaign was officially terminated and the
troops returned to their permanent posts shortly after dis
mounting and disarming had been completed,

General Crook*s

official farewell message to members of the Big Born and
Yellowstone Expedition was issued at Fort Robinson as his
General Order Number 8, dated October 24, 1876.

This docu

ment acknowledged the hardships- encountered by the force and
commended all personnel on the performance of their duty.
General Crook returned to his task of organizing the
Powder River Expedition.

The combat force for the Ge ne r a l ’s

second winter expedition consisted of units that had not
previously participated in the c a m p a i g n s .of 1876--except for
Company K of the Second Cavalry Regiment,

This unit, under

Captain James Egan, h a d been engaged in the Big Horn and
Yellowstone Expedition.

Other cavalry organizations were:

Companies H and K of the Third Cavalry Regiment; Companies
B, D, E, F, I, and M of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment;
Companies H and L of the Fifth Cavalry Regiment.

and

All

cavalry units w e r e placed under the command of Colonel
20

Records of the War Department, Record Group 94,
Document File 4165 (Sioux War; 1876, Item: 678B AGO 1876.
21_
King, o p . c i t ., pp. 16 /—58.

op

Ranald S. Mackenzie of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment,
Colonel Richard I, Dodge,
Infantry Regiment,

of the Twenty-third

commanded a large force of riflemen^*

The organizations u n der Colonel D o d g e Ts leadership were:
Batteries C, F, H, and K, Fourth Artillery Regiment,

that

had been designated to serve as infantry; Companies A, B,
C, F, I, and K of the Ninth Infantry Regiment; Companies D
and G of the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment; and Companies C,
G, and I of the Twenty-third Infantry Regiment,
A mule train of 400 animals was to provide mobility
to the quartermaster*s section.
and Dave Means,
packers,
dition.

The able leaders,

Tom Moore

supervised the pack train and the sixty-five

A column of 168 wagons accompanied the expe-

24

The wagon train employed during the Big Horn and

the Yellowstone Expedition ha d been retu.rned to Fort Laramie
for overhaul and refitting.

It was then directed to proceed

to Fort Fetterman to support the Powder River Expedition,
Major Frank North and his brother,

Luther North,

25
re

cruited a company of 100 Pawnee scouts for the expedition.
General Crook enlisted 150 Sioux, Arapahoes,
also serve as scouts.

22

Bourke,

op.

These Indians were mounted on ponies
c i t , , p. 389.

Ibid.,
24

and Cheyenne to

Ibid., p. 390.

2° Itold., p. 388.
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previously confiscated at Red Cloud Agency*

After the

expedition had been on the trail three days,

the column was

joined by 100 Shoshone and Bannock braves,
grove.

led by Tom C o s 

Frank Grouard was also to accompany the force.
?*'h©n the Powder River Expedition v/ao assembled at

Fort Fette.rman, it was composed of sixty-one officers,
enlisted men, and 350 Indians.
men was 1,847.
visors,

1,456

The total number-of fighting

If the sixty-five packers and their super

together with over 160 wagon teamsters were included

the total manpower of the expedition would have exceeded
2,000.

0*7

It is well to remember that mule packers and wagon

drivers were exceedingly capable Indian fighters.
The column departed Fort Fetterman on November 15,
and proceeded northward along the Bozeman Trail,

arriving at

Cantonment Reno--old Fort Reno--four days later.

Cantonment

Reno was one of the two forts established at the behest of
General Sheridan.

Some of the old structures ha d been r e 

habilitated under the energetic administration of Major
Pollock.

Although restoration was incomplete, Cantonment

Reno possessed supplies and shelter from strong Indian war
no

parties and the rigors of the Northern Plains winter.
General Crook directed the Arapahoes and Sioux to
^Brown,

o p. c i t . , pp. 294-96.

^ I b i d . , p. 294.
28

Bourke, op. cit., p. 391.
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pe rf or m a reconnaissance of the eastern slope to the Big
H orn Mountains.

The scouts departed Cantonment Reno on

November 18, and returned three days later.

Location of

many of the villages ha d been determined from a young
Cheyenne renegade,, who had been captured by the scouts.
The youth reported Crazy H o r s e 1s village was near the
29
b at tl ef i el d on the Rosebud River.
The column inarched northward along the Bozeman Trail
intent on mounting an attack on Crazy Horse.
Woman Creek,

At Crazy

about twenty miles north of Cantonment Reno,

Crook learned from one of his scouts,

Sitting Bear,

that

Crazy Horse had been warned of the presence of the e x pe 
dition.

The General,

not be trapped,

certain that his old adversary could

if forewarned,

diverted his attention to a

Cheyenne- village at the south end of the Big Horn
-it j_ •
oO
mountains•
■•Following the advice of his scouts, Crook directed
the column to move
camp.

Mackenzie,

southwest toward the renegade Cheyenne
with the vanguard of cavalry, made a

rigorous night march on November 24 and 25.

At dawn, his

force of cavalry and Indian allies burst upon the sleeping
village

that was located in a small valley of the Red Fork
^%rown,
30

op.

c i t . , p. 295.

Records of the War Department, Record Group 94,
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of Powder River*

The camp was instantly awakened and the

Cheyenne warriors organized a rear guard action,

while

squaws and children hurried for the cover of rocks and
ravines at the west end of the village*

31

After the first charge of the cavalry and the Indian
Allies,

the Cheyenne warriors retreated to the natural d e 

fensive positions where their families had hidden.

The

victors "began destroying the village in the afternoon and in
ramsacking the teepees, many articles were found that had
previously belonged to members of C u s t e r Ts annihilated b a t 
talion*

Among the more grisly trophies were found a buckskin

bag containing the right hands

of twelve Shoshone babies and

a necklace with eight Indian fingers attached as pendants.
Throughout November 25, the beleaguered Cheyennes
conducted a long-range
Scouts,

sniping duel with their enemies*.

in guarded conversation with the hostiles,

the village was under the leadership of Dull Knife.
Chief bitterly assailed the Sioux and Cheyenne

learned
The

scouts,

calling out,

"Go home--you have no business here; we can
»33
whip the white soldiers alone,
but can't fight you too."
This statement justified General Crook's
Indians to fight Indians.

policy of using

32
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Unable to dislodge, the fortified Cheyennes, M a c 
kenzie requested the infantry to support h i m with their long
rifles.

General Crook arrived with the foot troops,

com

m anded by Colonel Dodge, after the hostiles had withdrawn .
under the cover of darkness.

34

The Cheyennes retreated

several miles from their first defensive site and endured a
grim night, unsheltered from the November cold.

Eleven

babies expired in their m o t h e r s 1 arms; horses were killed
and their bellies cut open so the half-naked old me n and
55
women could warm their feet in the entrails.’'
Colonel Mackenzie reported 173 lodges destroyed,
ponies captured,

500

and twenty-five Indians confirmed as killed,

Among the Indian dead were three sons of Dull. Knife.
C r o o k 1s force lost one officer and five enlisted men killed
and twenty-five wounded.

^

The expedition returned to

Cantonment Reno and the Shoshones, upset by the pitiful
trox^hies discovered in the Cheyenne camp, hurried back to
their villages.

General Crook led the column eastward to

the headwaters of the Belle Fourche in a search for a d 
ditional renegade encampments.
sance,

Continuing their reconnais

the troops moved down the Belle Fourche. to the base
° *lbid.
5 5 lbid.

v'0Records of the War Department, Record Group. 94,
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of the Black H i ll s, enduring the discomfort of extreme cold.
Messengers were dispatched to Red Cloud Agency to obtain
information from the friendly Indians rega3?ding the location
of Crazy Horse's camp.

Since the horses were losing their

stamina, Crook also requested additional scouts with fresh
mounts.

His returning Indians brought information that

Crazy Horse and his band had fled to the Bad Lands of the
Little Missouri River, far beyond the range and endurance
of his weakening horses.

57

Dispatches from General Sheridan,

on December 20,

cautioned Crook that expenditures for transportation had
exceeded his monthly allowance of §65,000 by an additional
§28,000*

Having exhausted the supplemental grain and

feed from the pack train,

the animals were forced to exist

on grass of inferior quality,

which was mostly snow--covered.

Since there was little hope of establishing contact with the
enemy, General Crook resolved to terminate the campaign*
The column returned to Cantonment Reno,
echelon,

gathered, its rear

and arrived at Fort Fetterman on December 29*

The hostile Cheyennes,

after withdrawing from the

vicinity of the plundered camp,

started a painful march

across the frozen landscape to the encampment of Crazy
Horse*

Crow

scouts,

traveling south to Cantonment Reno, had

7 .0

Brown, op* cit,, p. 300*
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endured a frightful blizzard and near-starvation*

This

party had crossed the Cheyenne trail and had followed it
toward Rosebud Creek*

A Cheyenne campsite they examined

h a d consisted of hundreds of fires and little couches of
willows and grass-~but no teepees*

There was a difference

of opinion regarding the degree of hospitality displayed by
the Sioux to their Cheyenne friends*

One author states:

’’The Sioux treated them kindly and supplied most of their
v/ants."^

John G. Bourke related:

’’Crazy Horse" was indifferent to the sufferings of
his a3_Iies and turned the cold shoulder upon them com 
pletely, and this so aroused their indignation that
they decided to follow the example of those who had envn
rolled under our flag and sent in word to that effect* “
It was difficult to believe the Cheyennes would sur
render and seemingly absurd to accept the proposition that
they -would enlist against Crazy Horse*
Cloud were astounded when,

The personnel at Red

in the last days of December,

1876, and the first of January, 1877,
Cheyennes arrived at the agency*

groups of destitute

Their progress was n ec e s

sarily slow because of the condition of their ponies and the
wounded©

Finally,

the main band arrived and announced their
AT
intention, to fight their former friends* *
59
' George Bird Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes
(Norman;
University of Oklahoma Press, 195877.P® 382©
^ Bo ur ke ,
41

Ibid *

op* c it , ,'p, 594#

The impact of the Powder River Expedition on the
Northern Plains Indians is implied in B o u r k e ’s statements©
The Cheyennes h a d been the S iouxs’ most valuable ally.
warfare,

In

they h a d rivalled the Sioux in bravery and h a d

ridden in the vanguard with their friends,

the Sioux, to do

battle against the Great F a t h e r ’s pony soldiers.

News of

the destruction of Dull K n i f e ’s village, not only confirmed
the mighty Cheyennes had been severely chastised, but that
the Government’s forces would continue to conduct the
deadly winter campaigns until the non-reservation Indians
were subjugated©

Their will to resist withered even further

when the loyal Cheyennes flocked to the reservations and
became scouts for the Army.

The capitulation of Crazy Horse,

the greatest warrior of the Plains Indians, was undoubtedly
hurried, in the summer of 1877, by these considerations©

CONCLUSION
Similar to the conflicts o f 'mankind in other eras,
the Sioux War of 1876 illustrated the diversity of aims
f ostered by the warring groups*

Knowing the extreme d i 

vergence of economic and cultural aspirations of the Indians
and the A m e r i c a n s , the historical results could hardly be
avoided*

This divergence can be summarized by the I n d i a n 1s

characterization of the white- man as a despoiler and liar;
the white m a n ’s antipathy to the Indian was represented by
the inhumane statement,
Indian,

11The only good Indian Is a dead

- It was on these bases that the irreconcilable

impasse of' nineteenth century Western America was nurtured*
Final resolution was effected by the growing and
overwhedraing strength of the white men and the decreasing
strength c.f the Indians,

With the passage of years,

a

juxtaposltloning of strength occurred involving manpower,
economic foundation,

and group morale.

For the Tetons,

the

events of 1876 signaled the apex of this juxtapositioning
and the formidable Lakota would never again be the scourge
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of the Northern Plains*
Popular commentary has converted C u s t e r ’s annihi
lation on the Little Big Horn info the most significant
event during the campaigns of 1876*
dent,

From this Lloody inci

the cursory reader may assume the G o v e r n m e n t s troops

were led by inadequate officers*
undeniably gross,

While Custer* s action was

the basic military aims of the Sioux War

of 187G were doggedly pursued and the individual campaigns,
as directed and conducted by the primary Army commanders,
advanced the basic war objectives*
Prior to the Sioux War,

it was conceived that if

white and red men could not live peacefully on the same
lands,

they should, be separated*

Hence,

the Americans--the

stronger p a r t y - c o n c l u d e d it was humane to isolate the
Indians on reservations thereby preserving both American
and Indian lives.

The red men were to receive the benefits

of training In the white men* s civilization and Christi
anity, for which the Indian would not have traded one motheaten scalp*

Corralling the Indians onto reservations,

consequently, was the basic military.aim of 1876*
George C r o o k ’s contribution to the campaigns of
1876 was significant in achieving the Government’s desired
goal*

While the terminal fights with the Tetons were to

occur in the first portion of 1877 against Crazy Horse,
Sitting Bull and their adherents, Crook had effectively

blunted the keen edge of the militant Lakota,

in his ex pe 

ditions of the previous year*
Success In implementing the Government’s punitive
policy against the non-reservation Tetons was achieved
through slow,

grinding attrition rather than spectacular

victories on tne battlefield*

While the Indians avoided

pitched battles, unless the odds were greatly in their
favor,

or unless their encampments were Immediately

threatened,

the United States Army was reduced to employing

the tactic of harassment*
Rosebud,

Except for the Battle of the

the primary activity of the Government’s forces in

1876 was the pursuit of the nomads and destruction of e n 
campments®

Constant military pressure disrupted their

hunting economy and physically weakened the warriors,

as

well as the women and children©
General Crook was properly conditioned, by tempera
ment and Inclination,

to live the life of an Indian fighter*

Taciturn and phlegmatic, he bore the hardships of crude
bivouacs and. the rigors of the trail, without impairment to
his judgment*

As a dedicated 'soldier, he strove with

single-mindedness of purpose to execute the policy of his
g o v e ran an t , w ith ou t questioning; the moral correctness of
that policy*

In the execution of his duties, he applied the

tools found useful in previous Indian conflicts*

Among

these were the employment of Indians, as scouts for combat
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forces--preferably dissidents from the tribe being pursued;
the transfer of essential war material from wagons to mule
trains, attended by professional packers, when operating
from advanced supply bases,

or when it was necessary to

strike rapidly or into rough,

trackless terrain;

the

streamlining of his mounted troops by discarding n o n e s 
sential equipment,

thereby decreasing the load carried by

his cavalry horses and increasing the speed and flexibility
of his forces.

Whatever the merits of C r o o k ’s charges a-

gainst Colonel Reynolds and others,
after the Big Horn Expedition,
subsequent campaigns.
1876,

the legal actions taken

solidified discipline

The Horse Meat March,

in his

of September

could have resulted in subsequent widespread d e 

sertion,

denouncement,

or even mutiny.

Instead, his

capture of American H o r s e ’s village and the repulse of
Crazy H o r s e ’s counterattack at Slim Buttes prove he retained
command and control of his force,

although it was operating

on the verge of starvation and despair.
Cold fear, unreasoning hatred,

or secret guilt

nurtured the theory of extermination as the nineteenth
century solution to the Indian question.

This Western m y 

opia did not infect General C r o o k ’s attitude when fighting
or negotiating with his savage adversaries.

He discrimi

nated between Teton bands, which displayed a complaisant
attitude after surrender,

in 1876, and those that remained

115

truculent after they returned to the* reservations.

To

demonstrate that friends were properly recognised* he tried
to avoid disarming ana dismounting the friendly Tetons,
thereby earning the displeasure of General Sheridan*
ever,

How

scouts were enlisted for later campaigns from these

bands.
The picture of George Crook which emerges from, a
study of his military activities in 1876 portrays a durable,
stable,

and reliable leader®

He exuded no glamour and even

in the immediate aftermath of his greatest forays against
the Tetons, he appeared unspectacular*
the vignettes of history,

After interpreting

it must be concluded that General

Crook performed excellently in discharging his duties during
the Sioux War of 1 8 7 6 e
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by the primary Army officers in command of
Weste rn forces.
U.S.

S e n a t e . Testimony Taken by the Joint Committee on the k
Transfer of the Indian B u r e a u . 45th C o n g . , 3d
^
Sess.,. Senate Misc. Doc. 59.
Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1379.
Brigadier General Crook expressed his opinion
regarding transfer of the Indian Bureau from the
Department of the Interior to the War Department.

U.S. W ar Department. *Office of the Adjutant General.
Record Group 94.
Document File 4165 (S j.oj.x v.
*a r )
1 8 7 6 . Washington:
National Archives and Records
Service•
Contains correspondence and reports dated from
M a y 29, 1876 through December 13, 1877.
This m a 
terial is in the Nebraska State Historical Society
Archives, as microfilm record, number 555, Un 3,
NAS-68, Reel 1.
• Office of the Adjutant General.
Record Group
~94.
Selected Reports from 6160 AGO 1 8 7 5 .
Presents report of General C r o o k ’s activities
during the Big Horn Expedition of March., 1376,
and the attack on Crazy H o r s e ’s village.
Also,
contains records and correspondence related to
Court of Inquiry, 1877, regarding the conduct of
Col. Reynolds, Capt. Moore, and Capt. Noyes.
This
mo.terial is deposited in Nebraska State Historical
Society Archives as microfilm record entitled
“Powder River Expedition, 1 8 7 6 .u
_• Uni te d States Army Commands.
Record Group 98.
Department of the Platte. Letters Sent. April 2,
1856-October 50, 1 8 7 7 . Washington:
National
Archives and Records Service.
Includes correspondence and reports from
General Crook to Commander of the Division of the
Missouri (General Sheridan) during the period from
August 16, 1875 to September 25, 1876.
This
material is deposited in the Nebraska State H i s 
torical Society Archives, as microfilm record,
number 355, Un 3, MAS-68, Reel 1.
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Books

(Edited Government Works, Memoirs,

Bourke,

and R em in i s e n c e s )

John Gregory.
On the Border with C r o o k . Chicago:
Rio Grande Press, 1962.
A reprint of the 1891 edition.
Provides good
chronology, detail actions and quotations of
principal characters; also an extensive physical
description of General Crook and his mannerisms.

Bradley,

Lieutenant James H,
The March of the Montana
Column: A Prelude to the Custer Disa st er • Edited
by Edgar I. Stewart.
Norman:
University of
Oklahoma Press, 1961.
Describes Colonel G i b b o n ’s march from Port
Shaw, Montana Territory, to the Yellowstone River
rendezvous with General Terry.
Lieutenant
Bradley, Commander of Scouts for G ib b o n ’s Column,
was one of the first officers to view the carnage
of the Custer Battlefield.

Finerty,

John F.
War-Path and. Bivouac, or the Conquest of
the S io ux . Introduction by Oliver Knight,
Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1962.
A reprint of the 1890 edition.
Excellent
chronology, accounts of conversations, and d e 
scription of activity in C r o o k ’s Command from
May 6, 1876 through September 27, 1876.
Chro
nology corresponds.with that of Bourke and King.

Kappler, Charles J.
Indian Affairs.
Laws and T r ea ti es .
Vol. II: Trea ti es . Washington:
Government
Printing Office, 1904.
Presents the text of treaties negotiated by
the United States Government and Sioux tribes in
1851, 1865, and 1868.
King, Captain Charles,
Campaigning with C r o o k . Introduction
by Don Russell,
Norman:
University of Oklahoma
Press, 1964.
A reprint of 1890 edition.
As acting assistant
adjutant general for Colonel Wesley Merritt (Brevet
Major General), King recounts the activities of the
Fifth Cavalry Regiment in the interval between
June 4, 1876 and October 24, 1876,
Chronology
parallels the works of Bourke and Finerty.
Presents
excellent details of C r o o k ’s Horsemeat March.
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Mills, Brigadier General Anson.
My S t o r y . Edited by C . H.
Claudy.
Washington, D.C.:
Press of Byron S.
Adams, 1918.
The author, who served as a cavalry commander
under Crook, writes of his interception movements
against illegal mining parties attempting to enter
the Black Hills®
Mills was also a contemporary
observer of C r o o k ’s pursuit of the Sioux from June
through September, 1876, and commanded the a d 
vanced cavalry elements engaged in the Battle of
Slim Buttes.
Personal Memoirs of General William T. S he rman® Vol. XI,
2 vols. 2d ed.
New York:
D. Apoleton and Co.,
1886.
General Sherman relates his experience with
the Indian Commission, that promulgated the treaties
of 1868.
He states these treaties were designed to
foster the North-South reservation plan.
Presents
political background for the 'Quaker policy.
The Medal of Honor of the United States A r m y . W a s h in g to n,
B.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1948.
Citations for outstanding performance of duty
provides insight to the difficulties encountered
by valiant soldiers during the Sioux War of 1876.
Schmitt,

Marvin F. (ed.) General George Crook: His Auto
b i o g r a p h y . New ed.
Norman:
University of
Oklahoma Press, 1960.
C r o o k ’s work is of limited value to this study.
The Big Horn and Yellowstone Expeditions are p r e 
sented briefly.
The autobiography terminates on
June 18,' 1876, the da^r after the Battle of the
Rosebud.
The remainder of the story of C r o o k ’s
life is presented by Schmitt.
Secondary Works

Books
Andrist,

Ralph K.
The Long Death: The Last Bays of the
Plains I ndian. New York:
Macmillan Co., 1964.
A n d r i s t ’s account of the troubles of 1876
occupies only sixty-one pages of his book, but this
material Is vividly presented.
Excellent maps
illustrate the movements of the major campaigns.

Athearn,

Robert G.
William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settle
ment o-f. the W e s t . Norman:' ""University of Oklahoma
Press, 1956.
As Commander of the Division of the Missouri,
1865-1869, and General of the Army, 1869-1883,
Sherman e xe rted great Influence in settlement of
til© West, a n d was an eminent proponent of the trans
continental railroad.

Barrows, William.
The I n d i a n ’s Side of the Indian Ques ti on .
Boston;
D« Lothrop Co., 1887.
B ar ro ws contends the failure of American insti
tutions to provide a fair solution to the Indian
question was greatly affected by the low quality of
frontier society encountered by the Indians*
Branch,

Douglas E e The Hunting of the B u f fa lo . Intro
duction b y J* Frank Bobie.
Lincoln:
A Bison Book*
U ni ve rs it y of Nebraska Press, 1962.
An. excellent history of the buffalo on the North
. American Continent and the impact of its demise on
the I n d i a n s 1 nomadic culture*

Brown, M a r k H«
The Plainsmen of the Y ellowstone; A History
of the Yellowstone B a s i n . New York:
G. P. Putnam* s
Sons, 1961.
In eighty-three pages of lucidly written m a 
teria*! describing the Sioux difficulties, Brown
advances the concept that the depredation of r e n e 
gade Tetons was responsible for the A r m y ’s punitive
action*
D?Barthe, Joe®
Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard.
E dited a n d Introduced by Edgar I* Stewart.
New ed®
Norman;
University of Oklahoma Press, 1958.
Provides colorful background on Sioux life and
customs*
G r o u a r d 1s account sometimes appears to
border* on braggadocio and Mari Sandoz refutes his
v ersion of his r a c i a l -origins in her book, Crazy
Horse.
D o d g e , Richard Irving*
Plains of the Great West'and Their
Inhabitants B e i n g a Description of the P l a in s.,
Game* I n d i a n s * e tc., of the Great North American
Desert*
introduction by Wiliiam Blaekmore.
New
Yorks
Archer H o u s e , 1959®
This book is a reprint of an earlier edition,
the date of the original Is unknown.
However, the
reproduction of the a u t h o r ’s introduction was dated
O c t o b e r -5, 1876.
Although Cfe.orge B* Hyde in his

Bed Cloud* s Folk refers to D o d g e ’s ”stupid boox^
Tpagc 15ljT7'*XtT"Co 1 • Dodge was a contemporary ^of
General Crook and a student of the Plains Indians.
■ His hook contains interesting accounts of Sioux
tribal customs.
Gan o s , William Addleraan.
The H i s t ory of the ..Uni to d^Jdtcitop.
Army.
Revised ed.' New York:
D. Appleton-Century
CoIT 1942,
Chap ter I X » slThe Army 1s Da rk Age s , ,T dis ou s se a
■the impact of the economy-minded, post-bellum:
Congress on the effectiveness of the Army in com
bating the militant Plains Indians.
Graham., Colonel V/. A.
Abstract of the Official Record of
Fpocoedlnas of the Reno Court of Inquiry * H a r r .1.s burg:
The Stackpole Co., 1954.
'k partial record of the investigation Into the
battlefield, conduct of. Mad or Marcus A. Eeno by a
Court of Inquiry convened a t •Chicago, Illinois,
January 13, 1879, and adjourned February 11, 1879®
Surviving officers of the 7th Cavalry estimated the
strength of the Sioux, at the Little Big Horn, to
bo 3,000-5,000 warriors*
Grinnoll, George Bird.
The Fighting Cheyenne s. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1958*
■Grinnell, an unbiased scholar, has recorded the
major battles fought by the Cheyennes®
This bool:,
originally printed In 1915, remains a classic on
the subject of these valiant people®
Hassrick, Royal E . , in collaboration with. Maxwell, Dorothy
and Bach, Clio M.
The. Sioux: Life grid Gust oris _of. a
Warrior Soc 1ei y » N o r m a n : University of Oklahoma
Press, 1961o
This work outlines the tribal structure of the
Sioux and describes their patterns of behavior,
customs of their nation, and the concepts of their
imagination In peace and war.
Of special Interest,
is the analysis of the egocentric characteristics
of their society, which produced the marked a g 
gressiveness of the Sioux toward their enemies©
Hyde,

George E«
Spotted Tal.lT_s Folk:, A History of the
Brule S i o u x » N o r u e n ; Un.iversIty of" Ok 1 ahomoT"
Press, 1961*
The story of the great c h i ef ’s peaceful
struggle v/ith the United States Government to gain
the treaty rights of his people*
Although he

realized the futility of further conflict with the
government, he struggled against the conversion of
the Sioux Into imitation white men overnight*
. Bed C l o u d 1 s_ Folk: A H is to ry of the Oglala Sioux
"Indians. ~ 2d "'Printing,' “ist ed*. Norman:
University
of Oklahoma Pressj 1957.
The Sioux migration from the western Great
Lakes region to the plains of Dakota and Montana
was spearheaded by the Oglalas. This tribe was
foremost in aggression against the white Invaders
and other Plains Indians*
Hyde presents an account
of tne O g l a l a ’s massacre of Lieutenant G ra t te n’s
detail in 1854, Red C l o u d ’s War, 1866-68, and the
Custer Fight,
During the wars against the white
Invaders, between 1865-77, Red Cloud was the most
prominent Oglala and one of the greatest Sioux
leaders*
Johnson,

Virginia TJeisel*
The. Unreglmented^ Gen e r a l : A
BI o f-raphy o f N e 1 son A * M lies, Boston:
Houghton
: ■ iril'fiTn Co.” 1962.
Miles, as a troop commandsr v:as subordinate to
General Terry during the Yellowstone Expedition of
1876*
M i l e s 1 campaigns, during the winter of 187677, were a vital factor in'forcing the surrender of
Crazy Horse*

Bing, James T.
W a r Eagle: A Life of General E u g ene A_s_ Carr,
Lincoln:
University of NebrasIra Press J T 965*
A precisely documented biography of a capable
Indian fighter, who was a contemporary of Crook,
Terry, Mackenzie, and Merritt.
C a r r ’s opinions of
hi s superiors, during August and September, 1873,
are revealed in his letters tc his wife.
Knight,

Oliver*
Following the Indian Wars: The Story of
the, h ev;spa.per Correspondents Among the Indian
Campaigners.*
Norman:
University of Oklahoma
Press, 1.930*
A specialized view of the Indian Wars compiled
from a review of the activities of outstanding
correspond&ntss
Knight reveals the partisanship
which permeated the reports of several writers
attached to either T e r r y ’s or C r o o k ’s field h e a d 
quarters*

Le ck Ie , V711 XI am H * •The M i litany Conquest of the Southern
Plain s * Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press,
1963®
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An excellent work, covering the subjugation of
the Comanches, Kiowas, Arapahoes, and Southern
Cheyennes.
The concept of multi-pronged attack,
planned for use against the Sioux in the summer of
1876, had been well utilized against the Southern
Indians in 1874-75.
Colonel Ranald Mackenzie, a
participant of the Powder River Expedition of 1876
h a d been a notable troop commander in Texas prior
to his assignment under Crook.
Rickey,

Eon, Jr.
Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The
Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian W a r s .
Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.
Until the recent publication of this book and
The T r o o p e r s , below, little detail was available
regarding the life of the rank and file Regular
Army enlisted man.
This work constitutes a welldocumented source on the subjects of life on
western posts, discipline, crime, vice, punishment
and details of campaign preparation, field service
and combat.

Rister, Carl C o k e • Border Command: General Phil Sheridan in
the W e s t . Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press,
1944.
A rather cursory treatment of the impact of
She ri da n’s personality and directives during the
major Indian engagements on both Northern and
Southern Plains during the years 1868-77.
Rob in so n , Do a n e • A History of the Dakota, or Sioux Indians.
Reprint of Vol. 2, South Dakota Collections, 1904.
Minneapolis:.
Ross and Haines, Inc., 1956.
A detailed history of the Sioux Indians from
their earliest traditions, through their many wars
with white and Indian enemies, until their settle
ment on reservations and complete subjugation.
Ruby,

Robert H.
The Oglala Sioux: Warriors in Transition.
New York:
Vantage Press, Inc., 1955.
The Oglalas were the most warlike of the
Lakota, or Teton Sioux.
This book contains exce l
lent detail on the lives of the two great Oglala
chiefs, Red Cloud and Crazy Horse.

•San do z, Mari.
Crazy K o r s e : The Strange Man of the Og la la s•
Lincoln:
A Bison Book.
University of Nebraska
Press, 1962.
A detailed biography of the eminent Oglala
warrior, written by one knowledgeable In the customs

and legends of the Sioux*
Import ant events In^tne
life of Crazy H o r s e -are presented in chronological
order, following the index*
„

* These W e re the S i ou x* New York:
Hastings House
Publishers, 1961*
A sympathetic, poignant treatment of S i o u x ^
folklore*
Knowledge of the complexities of Indian
society helps elevate them, In present-day evalu
ation, frorn the level of brutes to a plateau of
sensitive and feeling people*

Seymour, Flora Warren*
Indian Agents of the Qld_.Ph^ n t i e r «
New York:
D* Appleton-Century Co., 1941.
A valuable account of the difficulties of
reservation agents In dealing with surrendered
tribes*
Sheldon, Addison E 0 Land Systems and Land Policies in
N ebraska«
("Publications of the Nebraska State
Historical Soci et y, n Vol. XXIi. 5 Lincoln:
.. Nebraska State Historical Society, X93S,
Sheldon examines seventeenth and eighteenth
century legal theories which justified state
proprietorship of New World -lands occupied by
aboriginal people*
Ihrapp, D a n .L.
A1 Sieber, Chief of S co ut s* Norman:
University “of Oklahoma Fress, 196*4,
General Crook's philosophy of fighting
Indian s with Indians was conclusively proven by AX
Sieber and his Tcnto Apache Scout during C r o o k ’s.
first tour of duty as Commander of the .Department
of Arizona, 1871-75*
utley, Kobert M * The L a st Days of the Sioux Nation*
New
Haven:
Yale University Press, 1865©
* Utley recounts the experiences of the Sioux
on reservations between 1880-91*
The failure of
the government to help the Indians bridge the gap
between two civilizations, together with the
Indians? reluctance to accept change, terminated In
the t r a g i c •massacre of the Sioux at Wounded Knee
Greek®
Vaughn,

J * W*
With. Crook at th e Hose bud*
Harrisburg:
The
Stackpole C o . , 1 9 5 6 T
*~
1 ■*
The most detailed exclusive treatment of the
Battle of the Rosebud available for this study.
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Official reports and contemporary accounts have
been utilized b y the author.
Vaughn designated
the sites of individual battlefield actions by
locating concentrated deposits of residual shells
and shell cases wi th a metal detector.
A front* piece map provides good battlefield orientation on
the extensive and irregular terrain over which the
many single actions of this engagement occurred.
______. The Reynolds Campaign on Powder R i v e r . Normant
University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.■
The story of C r o o k 1s first expedition against
the non-reservation Sioux and the first campaign in
the series o'f four major military activities
against the outlaw bands in 1876.
Vaughn*s liter
ary styling has been improved in this work, as
compared to his prior book With Crook on the Rose
b u d . The author has employed proper1 source m a 
terial and again u s e d the metal detector to p i n 
point the sites of specific actions by locating
d.eposits of shell cases.
Vestal,

Stanley.
Sitting Bull. Champion of the Sioux: A
B io gr a p h y . 2d Printing.
New ed.
Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1957*
A well written and engrossing biography of the
most widely known Sioux chieftain.
Vestal*s work
is based, in a large part, on interviews with
Indian acquaintances of Sitting Bull and with
white persons .who possessed first-hand information
of events important to a study of the c h i e f ’s
life •

Whiteman,

S. E.
The Troopers: An Informal History of the
Plains Cavalry, 1 8 6 5 - 1 8 9 0 . New York:
Hastings
House Publishers, 1962.
An informative compilation of customs, tra
ditions, weapons, crime and punishment, and m i l i 
tary pay of Western troopers.
Documentation of
information Is lacking and this book falls short
of the scholastic effort produced by Don Rickey in
his book on the same subject, previously listed.

Articles and Periodicals
Anderson, Harry H.
"A Challenge to Brown's Sioux Indian
Wars Thesis," Montana Magazine of Western H i s t o ry,
XXI, No. 1 (January, 1962), 40-49.
Anderson contends the Sioux War of 1876 was the
outgrowth of political byplay of the Grant Adminis
tration, in response to pressure from miners to
open the gold fields of the Biaclc Hills*
Bradley,

Lieut* James H*
"History of the Sioux," C ontri
butions to the Historical Society of M o n t a n a , IX
T1923), 67-68*
This article, by the soldier-author of the
journal that describes the movements of the Montana
Column in 1876, presents a harsh character analysis
of the Tetons*
Bradley emphasizes the majority of
suffering the Sioux experienced from white immi
grants and the government was the result of their
deliberate devilment, and that good will to persons
outside their familiar tribal circles was alv/ays
nonexistent*

Brininstool, E® A*
"Chief Crazy Horse, His Career and
Death," Nebraska History M a g a z i n e * XII, No, 1
(January-March, 1 9 2 9 )j 311, 374, 412-423.
This issue was devoted solely to the life of
Crazy Horse and presents articles from the Omaha
Daily H e r a l d , copies of military correspondence, and
an excellent bibliography of sixteen entries.
Brown, Mark H*
"A New Focus on the Sioux W a r , " Montana
Magazine of Western H i s t o r y , XI, No. 4 (October,
1961), 76-85.
Brown, author of The Plainsmen of the Yellow
stone , discusses the dissatisfaction of civil
authorities, military officials, and the Western
citizenry with the Sioux because of their aggression
against both whites and other- Indians*
The author
states the government directed punitive action by
the Army, in retaliation to the continued depre
dations of the outlaw Sioux,
De Land, Charles Edmund.
"The Sioux Wars," South Dakota
Historical C o l l e c t i o n s , XV (1950), 29-64, 194-275.
An extensive treatment of the history of Sioux
conflict with the government,
Sources utilized are:
Doane Robinson's History of the S i o u x ; reports from
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs; and Volume II of

Charles J* Kapple'r1 s work on Indian treaties#
De Land discusses the backgrohnd of the Treaty of
Laramie of 1851„ the Ponder River Expedition of
1865, Red Cloud's War of 1866-67, the surveys, of the
northern Pacific Railroad, the Custer Expedition to
the Black Rills in 1874, and the campaigns of 1876.
Grange,

Roger T., Jr*
"Port Robinson, Outpost on the
Plains,'1 .
N e b raska History H a u a z l n e , XXXIX, Ho* 5
(September, 1958}, 191-240#
Camp (later, Fort) Robinson was established a d 
jacent to the Red Cloud Agency and was named in
honor of a L t » Levi H* Robinson#
This article d i s 
cusses the establishment of the Red Cloud and.
Spotted Tail Agencies, and Camp Sheridan--in the
neighborhood of the Spotted Tail, Agency®
Grange
covers the final surrender of Crazy Horse and his
hostile band, the Powder River Expedition of 1876,
and the Cheyenne trek from the Indian Territory,
(Oklahoma}, to the Red Cloud Agency#

Malin>-James G.
11Indian Policy and Westward Ex pa ns io n, ,r
Humanistic Studies, II, Ho# 3, B u lletin of the.
UnIversity of Kansas, XXII, No, 17 (November i,
1929 f, If-105 ,
An excellent treatise on the political factors
and legislative measures surrounding the development
of the northern and Southern Indian Reservation
policy#
M a l i n !s work is authoritative, clearly
presented, and well documented#
Matt is 02?., Ray H„
11The Army Posts on the Northern Plains,
1885-1885 ,v N e b r a ska History Maga zi ne , XXXV, No® 1
(Ma t ch., 19 54) , 19 - 4o #.
The term. Northern Plains, In this article In
cludes the present states of Nebraska, Wyoming,
Montana, and North and South Dakota*
MattIson r e 
views the justification for establishment of the
p o s t s , lists their locations, provides Intiraate
views of the troo pe rs 1 lives on the Western
frontier#
» uThe Indian Reservation System of the Upper
Missouri, 1855-1885« u Nebraska History M a g a z i n e ,
XXXVI, N i e 3. ( S e p t e ^ e r r i 9 5 5 l 7 ~ 4 1 ^ j . 7 2 7 ^ ~ “
The authc*r discusses the development of the
g overnment?s policy for control of the Northern
Plains Indians, the history of the agencies, and the
difficulties encountered In administration *
M a t t i s o n 1s footnotes provide references to

applicable books and government publications*
McCann, Lloyd E.
"The Grattan Massacre,11 Nebraska History
Magazine. XXXVII,'No. 1 (March, 1S56), 1-25.
The~death of Lt. John L 0 Grattan and his detail
of troops in August 19, 1854, while penetrating a
Sioux encampment, is considered a starting point in
the h i s t o r y of bad relations between the Tetons and
the Uni te d States Government.
This incident o c 
curred over the t r o o p s 1 attempt to recover a d e 
crepit cow lost by Mormon immigrants.
Means,

Dav id Y*
"Campaign Against Crazy H o r s e , 51 Pro
ceedings and C o l l e ctions of the Nebraska State
H 1stor1ca1 "soc1e t v , XV, N e b r a ska State H i storical
Soclety Publications, Series II, X , {190?T, 68«77*
~
Mears was with General Crook as transportation
m an ag er during the campaigns against the Indians
f r o m 1874 to 1879*
The description of a military
mule train by Hears is a valuable item of infor
mation from s. contemporary expert®

Pennington, Robert*
"An Analysis of the Political Structure
of the Teton-Dakota Indian Tribe of North America, ''
North Dakota H i story® XX, No. 5 (July, 1953),
150-155, ~
Pennington discusses the Instruments of the
Teton political system: the chieftains, or e xecu
tives; the tribal councils, or legislative bodies;
and the v/arrior societies, or those who performed
policing activities.
The political organization of
these powerful primitives was an anarchy only in
that it permitted unrestrained individual freedom
if tribal security was not endangered*
Prickett, Robert G.
"The Malfeasance of William Worth
Belknap, Secretary of War, October 13, 1869, to
March. 2, 1876, 11 North Dakota History. XVII, N o . 1
(Jana a r y , 3.950), o -3 4 ©
The n epotism of President Grant and the greed
of his brother, 0rvi3., were a part of the gross
governmental corruption that infected public e m 
ployees In the post-Givi! War era*
The author p r e 
sents I n t i m a t e ,details of Secretary- B e l k n a p 1s I n 
volvement; In the corruption associated with awarding
of sutler* s contracts on Aimiy posts®
General G. A*
C u s t e r 1 s resentment of Belnap may partially account
for the Impetuous Indian f i g h t e r 1s ill-considered
attack at.the Little Big Horn*
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Utley,

Robert M.
11The ■Celebrated Peace Policy of General
. Grant,*1 North Dako ta History, XX, No. 3
(■
Ju l y , 1 9 5 3 j , 3.21 ~ 1 4 2 e
An excellent and well documented review of the
concept and management of Indian affairs during the
Grant Administration.
Utley proves that G r a n t ’s
Indian policy, though well conceived, was nullified
b y inept supervision from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, loss of capable management talent- throughpolitical maneuvering, and the corruption of p o l i 
tical employees— at all levels®

